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0UE8TI0N8 PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a 
statement in an opinion column that an elected official changed 
his position on a matter of public concern during a hotly con-
tested political campaign is defamatory under Utah law? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a 
statement in an opinion column that an elected official "attempts 
to manipulate the press" is defamatory under Utah law? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that the 
views expressed by a political columnist that an elected official 
changed his position on a matter of public concern are not 
protected political opinion under the U.S. Supreme Court's 
opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously refuse to 
consider whether "opinions" expressed in op-ed columns are 
afforded greater protection under Article I, Section 15 of the 
Utah Constitution than under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution when the issue was raised as an affirmative defense 
in the trial court, was briefed extensively by the parties on 
appeal, and was the subject of a supporting amicus brief? 
5. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a 
public official libel plaintiff need not produce "clear and 
-iv-
convincing evidence" of a media defendants' actual malice in 
order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, 
but need produce only sufficient evidence to raise "the possibil-
ity that a jury might find actual malice?" 
6. Is evidence that a newspaper publisher sought the 
advice of legal counsel and had his managing editor review an 
opinion column before it was published sufficiently probative of 
the publisher's alleged actual malice so as to require denial of 
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment? 
7. Is evidence that a newspaper publisher printed a 
libel plaintiff's letter to the editor as a rebuttal to an 
opinion column probative of the publisher's actual malice? 
8. Is evidence that an editor knew that one (of 
several) of a columnist's sources for an allegedly defamatory 
statement concerning an elected official was the official's 
"political enemy" sufficiently probative of actual malice so as 
to require denial of an otherwise properly supported motion for 
summary judgment? 
9. Is a statement reflecting an editor's knowledge 
five months after an allegedly defamatory column was published 
probative of the editor's state of mind at the time the column 
was published? 
-v-
OPINION BELOW 
As of the date this petition was prepared, the Court of 
Appeals' decision below was not published. Copies of the Court 
of Appeals' majority and dissenting opinions are attached hereto 
in Appendix "A". 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals' decision was issued May 28, 1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1991) which grants the Utah 
Supreme Court jurisdiction over "a judgment of the court of 
appeals." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The constitutional provisions and statutes which are 
relevant to this petition are set forth in Appendix "B". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case stems from certain allegedly defamatory 
statements contained in three op-ed columns published on June 27, 
1988, July 2, 1988 and November 20, 1988 on the opinion page of 
the Daily Spectrum. The June and July columns criticized plain-
tiff for changing his political position from being opposed to 
municipal power in the city of LaVerkin during the 1987 mayoral 
campaign to supporting municipal power after he took office as 
Mayor. The November column accused plaintiff of repeated 
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attempts to "manipulate the press." Copies of the three columns 
are attached hereto in Appendix "C." Plaintiff sued the colum-
nist, his editor, the publisher of the newspaper and the newspa-
per. In a series of rulings, Judge Phillip Eves of the Fifth 
District (a) granted summary judgment as to publisher Donald 
Hogun and editor Brent Goodey on all claims stemming from the 
June and July 1988 columns because plaintiff failed to establish 
a prima facie case of actual malice by clear and convincing 
evidence (R. 3 63) ; (b) granted summary judgment as to columnist 
Rick Guldan on the claims arising from the June and July columns 
because Guldan7s statements were constitutionally protected 
expressions of opinion and thus, not actionable (R. 360); and (c) 
dismissed the claim against editor Brent Goodey for statements in 
his November 1988 column because the statements were not 
defamatory under Utah law. (R. 102). 
Following briefing on defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the United States Supreme Court decided Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal, and plaintiff moved for reconsideration. 
The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum 
opinion analyzing Milkovich. upheld the Court's prior rulings and 
certified as final under URCP 54(b) all orders entered in the 
case. (R. 422) . Copies of the Memorandum Opinions and Judgment 
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of Dismissal by the District Court are attached hereto in 
Appendix "D." 
Plaintiff subsequently appealed. 
In a split decision, the majority opinion of the Court 
of Appeals held (a) that the assertion by Guldan that the plain-
tiff changed his position on the issue of "municipal power" was 
capable of defamatory meaning and not constitutionally protected 
opinion under the U.S. Constitution and refused to consider 
whether it was protected opinion under the Utah Constitution 
(Slip Op. at 5-12); (b) that summary judgment for publisher Hogun 
and editor Goodey was proper with respect to the June Column, but 
improper with respect to the July column because plaintiff's 
eventual burden at trial was irrelevant to a motion for summary 
judgment and therefore, the case should go to trial because a 
reasonable jury could find that Goodey and Hogun acted with 
actual malice (Id. at 12-16); and (c) that Goodey7s accusation 
that plaintiff "attempts to manipulate the press" was possibly 
1
 By order dated February 1, 1991, this Court exercised its authority and 
poured-over the case to the court of appeals for disposition. The Court of 
Appeals, sua sponte. requested additional briefing on the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court to hear the Rule 54(b) certification and subsequently issued 
its opinion on the merits of the appeal on May 28, 1992. 
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susceptible to a defamatory meaning under Utah law and thus 
2 
created a jury issue. (id. at 16-18)• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Parties. 
Plaintiff Terry West, at all times relevant herein, was 
the duly elected mayor of LaVerkin, Utah (R. 275). Defendant 
Donald Hogun is the publisher of The Daily Spectrum and has been 
so since 1986 (R. 275). Defendant Brent Goodey is the managing 
editor of The Daily Spectrum and has been so since 1987 (R. 276). 
Defendant Rick Guldan, at all times relevant to this action, was 
a columnist for The Daily Spectrum (R. 276). 
2 The June 27, 1988 Guldan Column. 
The June column appeared on the Opinion page of the 
newspaper and showed Guldan's photograph and by-line. 
In his June column, Guldan criticized plaintiff for 
several items, including, among other things, for changing his 
political position from being opposed to municipal power during 
1
 The dissent argued that neither the assertion that plaintiff changed his 
position on the issue of municipal power or that he "attempts to manipulate 
the press" are susceptible of defamatory meaning under Utah law and that the 
trial court properly applied "heightened scrutiny" on defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. (Slip Op. at 19-22). 
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the 1987 Mayoral campaign to supporting municipal power after he 
took office as Mayor (R. 277-78). 
The issue of "municipal power" was a controversial 
issue in the City of LaVerkin prior to the publication of the 
columns in question (R, 278, Complaint f 10)• The statements 
relating to plaintiff's political position on municipal power 
were based on the following sources: 
(a) Guldan's personal observations of comments made by 
citizens at City Council meetings where plaintiff was accused of 
changing the position he had taken in 1987 during the campaign of 
opposing municipal power (R. 339); and 
(b) Guldan's conversations with several LaVerkin 
residents (R. 339). 
3. Plaintiffs July 1, 1988 Letter to the Editor, 
On July 1, 1988, plaintiff met with publisher Hogun at 
the newspaper's offices and gave Hogun a Letter to the Editor 
"refuting" the statements in the June Guldan column (R, 280). (A 
true and correct copy of plaintiff's Letter to the Editor as 
published is attached hereto in Appendix "E"). 
4. The July 2, 1988 Guldan Column, 
The July column appeared on the Opinion page of the 
newspaper and was accompanied by Rick Guldan's by-line and 
photograph and an Editor's Note describing it as a response to 
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the Letter to the Editor written by plaintiff which was being 
published simultaneously. The July Guldan column was reviewed 
and approved by legal counsel prior to publication (R. 281). 
5. The November 20, 1988 Goodev Column. 
On November 20, 1988 defendant Brent Goodey wrote a 
column appearing on the opinion page of the newspaper under his 
by-line and with his photograph. In his column, Goodey expressed 
his view that two feuding local public officials, one of which 
was plaintiff, repeatedly "attempted] to manipulate the press." 
6. Publisher Donald Hogun's Involvement and State of 
Mind. 
Publisher Hogun did not review the June or July Guldan 
columns prior to publication (R. 281-83). On July 1, 1988, Hogun 
met with St. George attorney Tim Anderson for the purpose of 
discussing the June 27, 1988 Guldan column, plaintiff's Letter to 
the Editor and what course of action the newspaper should take 
under the circumstances (R. 282). 
Based upon advice of counsel, Hogun published plain-
tiff's Letter to the Editor with an editor's note, next to the 
July Guldan column and took no further action or investigation (R 
282). Attorney Anderson expressed his opinion to publisher Hogun 
that, with a single exception not relevant to this petition, 
plaintiff's complaints about Guldan's June column concerned 
expressions of Guldan's opinions to which a retraction or 
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clarification was not necessary nor appropriate (R. 282). Hogun 
asked attorney Anderson to review and approve the July Guldan 
column prior to publication (R. 283), which Anderson did (R. 
347) . 
7. Editor Goodey*s Involvement and State of Mind, 
Goodey was the Managing Editor of the Daily Spectrum at 
the time of publication of the June and July Guldan columns and 
reviewed the same prior to publication (R. 283). Editor Goodey 
made no substantive changes to the Guldan columns (R, 283)• 
As managing editor, Goodey had reviewed hundreds of 
stories and columns written by defendant Guldan prior to June 
1988 (R. 283)• Goodey considered Guldan to be an experienced, 
reliable and accurate reporter (R. 283) . Goodey did not doubt 
and had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the factual informa-
tion in the Gulden columns and made no effort to independently 
verify any information in the columns (R. 284) . Guldan's July 
column was reviewed and approved prior to publication by attorney 
Anderson and Goodey relied on Anderson's review and approval in 
publishing said column (R. 286). 
ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals' majority opinion is a troubling 
decision which has many profound and far reaching implications, 
not only because it alters the jurisprudential landscape of the 
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law of libel in Utah, but also because it dramatically impacts 
how journalism hereafter will be practiced in the state. 
As discussed below, the majority opinion substantially 
and incorrectly rewrites the law of libel in Utah, is contradic-
tory to decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other 
panel decisions of the Court of Appeals, and punishes the press 
for engaging in what heretofore had been recognized and encour-
aged as responsible journalistic behavior. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT 
THE STATEMENT IN AN OP-ED COLUMN THAT AN 
ELECTED OFFICIAL "ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THE 
PRESS" IS DEFAMATORY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
The Court of Appeals, relying upon a secondary meaning 
from Webster's Dictionary of the word "manipulate" held that the 
mere "possibility of debate" concerning whether the statement is 
defamatory required the trial judge to send the issue to the 
jury. (Slip Op. at 16-19.) This holding emasculates the trial 
judge's function in the judicial process because the trial court 
is no longer required to evaluate allegedly defamatory state-
ments. Rather, he or she is required to search for any "possi-
ble" defamatory meaning attributable to the subject statement. 
This holding runs counter to prior rulings from this Court. See 
Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah 1979) (holding that a 
court must adopt the more innocuous of two potential interpreta-
tions in determining whether a statement is slanderous per se) ; 
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Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) (dismissing libel claim 
despite fact that it is at least possible to debate whether hav-
ing one's picture taken with Senator Hatch without consent is 
defamatory). 
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION WILL UNAVOIDABLY CHILL 
ROBUST COMMENT AND DEBATE ON CONTROVERSIAL 
POLITICAL ISSUES THROUGH ITS INCORRECT APPLI-
CATION OF MILKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL. 
In its landmark decision of Milkovich v. Lorain Jour-
nal, 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990) the United States Supreme 
Court enunciated a test for differentiating between actionable 
false statements of fact and non-actionable false statements of 
opinion. The Court held that statements relating to matters of 
public concern will receive full constitutional protection where 
the statements "do not contain a provably false factual connota-
tion." Id. at 2706. The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied 
the Milkovich test by incorrectly focusing on whether or not it 
could be proved that plaintiff opposed "municipal power" for the 
3 
city of LaVerkin prior to his election as Mayor of the City. 
3 The Court of Appeals framed the issue as follows: 
West's public position is an objectively verifiable 
fact. At trial, West may present his evidence to show 
his public support of the project; defendants may then 
present their evidence to prove his public opposition 
to municipal power. The jury must then determine 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The correct inquiry is not on the literal words of the 
statement, but on the connotation of the statement, i.e., that 
West intended to mislead or deceive the voters by opposing munic-
ipal power during his campaign for Mayor. 
The offending language — "Terry West, when running for 
Mayor, was opposed to it [municipal power] — raises two analyti-
cally distinct questions. First, there is the literal meaning of 
the words themselves — i.e., did the plaintiff support or oppose 
4 
municipal power before the election? Second, what connotation 
arises from the context of the statement, i.e., did plaintiff 
intend to deceive the voters when he opposed municipal power dur-
ing his campaign for Mayor? The first question debatably may be 
provable (the trial court held it was not because there was no 
objective, independent proof as required by Milkovich), the sec-
ond question clearly is not. The majority opinion of the Court 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
whether West supported or opposed municipal power 
prior to the election. 
Slip Op. at p. 11. 
Obviously, it is not defamatory on its face to falsely accuse an elected 
official of opposing a public issue such as municipal power. Any possible 
defamatory meaning must come from the context of the statement. 
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of Appeals erroneously focused exclusively on the f i r s t question, 
while ignoring the more important second question. 
The t r i a l c o u r t s analysis , which was rejected by the 
Court of Appeals, i s consistent with the factual analysis u t i -
l ized in Milkovich. In Milkovich, the offending statements were 
contained in an a r t i c l e implying that a high school wrestling 
coach had l ied under oath in a judicial proceeding by giving t e s -
timony contradictory to prior testimony he gave at an administra-
t ive hearing. In concluding the statements implied facts capable 
of being proved or disproved and therefore not ent i t l ed to con-
s t i tu t iona l protection as opinion, the Court noted that: 
A determination of whether pet i t ioner 
l ied in th i s instance can be made on a core 
of objective evidence by comparing, inter 
a l i a , pe t i t ioner ' s testimony before the OSHA 
board with his subsequent testimony before 
the t r i a l court. Id. at 2707. (emphasis 
added). 
The Milkovich Court further noted that unlike a "sub-
ject ive assertion" that someone l ied ( i s afforded constitutional 
protect ion) , the defamatory implication in Milkovich was "an 
^ West could have opposed (or supported) municipal power pr ior to his 
e lec t ion as Mayor for a myriad of reasons, including, among others , (1) that 
he t ru ly believed h is posi t ion was sound (2) that he believed municipal power 
would benefi t himself, the c i ty , the s t a t e or the public en t i ty or (3) that he 
believed he could p o l i t i c a l l y gain by his pos i t ion . As the t r i a l court cor-
rec t ly held, none of these possible connotations are susceptible of being 
proved true or false by "independent objective proof." 
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a r t i c u l a t i o n of an object ively ve r i f i ab l e event ," i . e . , p l a in -
t i f f ' s testimony in Court (which i s not e n t i t l e d to cons t i t u -
t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n ) . Id . a t 2707. 
The "core of object ive evidence" ava i lab le to prove 
whether a statement i s t rue or f a l se , which was so e s s e n t i a l to 
the Milkovich r e s u l t , i s simply absent from t h i s case . This i s 
so because i t i s not provable as fact t ha t p l a i n t i f f intended to 
. . 7 
deceive the voters on the issue of municipal power. This court 
should accept c e r t i o r a r i to consider the important question of 
the proper appl ica t ion of Milkovich and thereby avoid c h i l l i n g 
robust debate on p o l i t i c a l issues in the Sta te of Utah. 
° The t r i a l court' s dec i s ion dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s claims against Goodey 
with respect to the statement that p l a i n t i f f attempts to "manipulate the 
press" may be affirmed on t h i s ground as we l l . 
' The t r i a l court ' s ana lys i s a l so g ives appropriate considerat ion to the 
type of speech involved -- p o l i t i c a l speech. The i ssue of "municipal power" 
was a heated controversy in the community of LaVerkin and was a major i ssue in 
the 1988 c i t y e l e c t i o n s . The public debate surrounding municipal power was an 
exerc i se of fundamental core p o l i t i c a l speech that the F ir s t Amendment was 
e s tab l i shed to encourage and f o s t e r . To adopt the p l a i n t i f f ' s view -- that he 
need merely deny the p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n a t tr ibutable to him or produce a 
s e l f - s e r v i n g document purporting to se t forth h i s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n and thus 
obtain a jury t r i a l -- s t r i k e s at the heart of the F ir s t Amendment's "v i ta l 
guaranty of free and uninhibited d iscuss ion of public i s s u e s , " Milkovich. Id. 
at 2707. 
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III. THE REFUSAL BY THE COURT OP APPEALS TO CON-
SIDER THE ISSUE OP WHETHER THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION AFFORDS GREATER PROTECTION TO THE PRESS 
IN THE AREA OF PROTECTED OPINION THAN DOES 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS LEGALLY INCORRECT 
AND SQUANDERS A RARE OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER 
DEVELOP THE STATED CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRU-
DENCE IN AN IMPORTANT AREA OF THE LAW. 
This case presented the first opportunity since the 
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Milkovich 
v. Lorain Journal for a Utah appellate court to address the ques-
tion of what protections, if any, are independently afforded to 
Q 
expressions of opinion under Utah's constitution. Rather than 
avail itself of this opportunity, the Court of Appeals, relying 
9 
on three of its prior decisions, summarily refused to consider 
the state constitutional issue on the grounds that constitutional 
issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Slip Op. 
at 7, n.5.) 
The Court's cursory treatment of the issue i s flawed 
for two reasons. First , contrary to the majority's assertion, 
° The court in Milkovich inv i t ed s t a t e courts to reassume the ir 
long-standing ro le as the primary developer of s t a t e and common law p r i v i l e g e s 
and several s t a t e s have done so . E .g . . Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski. 77 N.Y. 
2d 235 (N.Y. 1991) (recognizing an opinion p r i v i l e g e based on New York's s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n ) . 
9
 State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 
1268 (Utah App. 1990); and State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991). 
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the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s sue was ra i sed in the t r i a l court . 
Second, and more importantly, each of the three cases r e l i e d upon 
by the majority opinion involved circumstances where an appel lant 
was seeking reversa l of a verd ic t or judgment entered below on 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds not ra i sed below. In such circumstances, 
where a t r i a l judge does not have the opportunity t o consider an 
i s s u e , i t i s unfair to overturn h i s or her d e c i s i o n on grounds 
not ra i sed for cons iderat ion . Here, however, the circumstances 
involve an appel lee who seeks not reversa l , but affirmance, of 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . Thus, the fundamental problem of 
unfairness t o a t r i a l court of overturning a d e c i s i o n on a bas i s 
on which the t r i a l court had not considered, i s therefore absent. 
This i s why t h i s court has recognized the ''long standing rule" 
that an appe l la te court may affirm a judgment of a lower court 
"on a ground other than that r e l i e d on by the Court." Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1988) c i t i n g Spor v. Crested Butte 
i U
 Defendants' Second Affirmative Defense to p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint averred 
that "The Statements complained of are expressions of opinion and are pro-
tected under the F i r s t and Fourteenth Amendments of the Consti tution of the 
United States and Art ic le I . Sections 1 & 15 of the Utah State Constitution" 
(emphasis added). (R. 146). The s t a t e cons t i tu t ional issue was ora l ly argued 
at the hearing on defendants7 motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, a 
t r ansc r ip t of the hearing, which involved only legal argument, was not 
requested. Moreover, the issue was extensively t rea ted by respondents in 
the i r appellate br ief and oral argument and was the primary subject addressed 
in an amicus br ief f i l ed with the Court of Appeals. 
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Silver Mining Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987); Thornock v. Cook. 
604 P.2d 934 (Utah 979).1:L 
I V , THE MAJORITY OPINION DENIGRATES THE PROPER 
ROLE OP THE TRIAL COURT BY REJECTING THE 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD ORDI-
NARILY APPLIED IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
INVOLVING ACTUAL MALICE ISSUES IN FAVOR OF A 
LESSOR STANDARD WHICH MANDATES A JURY TRIAL 
IF THERE EXISTS A "POSSIBILITY" THAT A JURY 
"MIGHT" FIND ACTUAL MALICE. 
The Court of Appeals re jec ted the t r i a l c o u r t ' s holding 
t h a t f i r s t amendment considera t ions compelled West t o present 
"c lea r and convincing" evidence t h a t Hogun and Goodey acted with 
ac tua l malice and held t h a t Hogun and Goodey were not e n t i t l e d to 
summary judgment because West came forward with su f f i c i en t e v i -
dence to demonstrate the " p o s s i b i l i t y " t h a t a jury could find 
t h a t they acted with ac tua l malice with respect to the July co l -
umn. (Sl ip Op. a t 12-16.) These holdings f ly in the face of the 
Supreme Cour t ' s decis ion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 
11 It i s ironic that the same court which has chastised the bar of this 
state for not adequately briefing state constitutional issues ("until such 
time as attorneys heed the cal l of the appellate courts of this state to more 
fully brief and argue the applicabil ity of the state constitution [citations 
omitted] we cannot meaningfully play our part in the judicial laboratory of 
autonomous state constitutional law development,'' State v. Bobo. 803 P. 2d 
1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990)) declined to substantively treat the issue when i t 
is squarely presented in a fully briefed and argued context. 
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242 ( 1 9 8 6 ) 1 2 which held that a public figure libel plaintiff must 
present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice in order 
to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment. Nonethe-
less, the majority opinion's discussion of Liberty Lobby is rele-
gated to a mere footnote (Slip Op, at 15-16, n. 11) . 
In rejecting a standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence, the majority opinion made an anemic attempt to distinguish 
this court's decision in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P. 2d 556 (Utah 1988) 
which expressly acknowledged that there is a First Amendment 
interest in disposing of libel cases on motion where "it appears 
12 in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the United States Supreme Court held that 
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civ i l Procedure d i c t a t e s the respect ive 
ro les of the t r i a l judge and jury and mandates that the t r i a l court consider 
the ev ident iary burden which the p l a i n t i f f must u l t imate ly bear at t r i a l when 
rul ing on a defendant's motion for summary judgment. In a public f igure l i b e l 
case , the p l a i n t i f f must demonstrate actual malice by c lear and convincing 
evidence, i d . at 252. 
In the Liberty Lobby dec i s ion , the court recognized the inextr icable 
l ink between the underlying substantive law and the province of the judge to 
determine whether a reasonable jury could find for the p l a i n t i f f . Id. at 
249-252. A judge simply cannot determine whether a reasonable jury could find 
for the p l a i n t i f f without reference to the burden that the jury must use in 
determining whether the p l a i n t i f f has met that burden. To hold otherwise, as 
did the majority opinion, i s to return to the days when appel late courts 
expressed the ir inherent d i s t r u s t for t r i a l courts and denigrated the ir role 
in the j u d i c i a l process by requiring them to send a l l cases to the jury when a 
p l a i n t i f f s e t s forth a s c i n t i l l a of evidence in h i s or her favor. Id. 
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that a reasonable jury could not f ind for the p l a i n t i f f s , " c i t i n g 
13 Liberty Lobby. 
In addi t ion , a d i f f e r e n t panel of the Court of Appeals 
has already held that "in evaluat ing whether the evidence revea l s 
a genuine i s s u e of material f a c t , the court must take in to con-
s i d e r a t i o n the eventual standard of proof at t r i a l on the mer-
i t s . " Robinson v. Intermountain Healthcare, 740 P.2d 262, 264 
14 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . This Court should accept c e r t i o r a r i to 
avoid damage t o the F i r s t Amendment i n t e r e s t s which are protected 
by r e s o l u t i o n of l i b e l ac t ions on motions for summary judgment 
and t o avoid confusion caused by i n c o n s i s t e n t opinions from the 
Court of Appeals. 
13 The majori ty 's d i s t i n c t i o n read too much into t h i s Court's statement 
dec l in ing to dismiss the complaint on f i r s t amendment grounds. Summary judg-
ment simply was not appropriate on the record before the Cox court because of 
the paucity of the record before the court. Id. at 560. 
The majority a l so ignored dec i s ions from t h i s Court which have looked to 
federal court in terpreta t ions of the Federal Rules as in terpre t ive aids for 
the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure. See F i r s t Security Bank v. Colin. 817 P.2d 
298, 299 (Utah 1991); Capital Citv Bank v. Landes. 795 P. 2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 
1990). Under these case s , the holding in Liberty Lobby i s persuasive author-
i t y for Utah to recognize a c lear and convincing evidence standard when apply-
ing Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civ i l Procedure in actual malice cases . 
1^ I r o n i c a l l y , Judge Jackson, who cas t the deciding vote in t h i s ac t ion , 
authored the above statement in Robinson. Id. at 263. 
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V. THE MAJORITY OPINION WILL DISCOURAGE RESPON-
SIBLE EDITORIAL DECISION-MAKING BY PUBLISHERS 
AND EDITORS IN THAT THE LONG-STANDING AND 
ACCEPTED JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE OF 
PREPUBLICATION LEGAL REVIEW MAY NOW BE CON-
SIDERED AS "EVIDENCE" OP ACTUAL MALICE. 
The majority opinion held that prepublication review of 
the July article by the Daily Spectrum's counsel may be consid-
ered by a jury as evidence that publisher Hogun acted with actual 
malice with respect to the July article. Slip. Op. at 14. Peti-
tioners are aware of no other jurisdiction in the country which 
has adopted such an aberrant view, which view was not briefed or 
hardly even argued. The issue has serious implications for jour-
nalism and the efficacy of the attorney-client privilege. Cer-
tiorari should be granted on this basis alone to allow a thorough 
analysis of the issue. 
VI. THE MAJORITY OPINION TRAMPLES WELL-SETTLED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES DESIGNED TO GIVE 
THE PRESS THE "BREATHING SPACE" NECESSARY TO 
ENSURE A FREE AND UNINHIBITED DISCUSSION OF 
PUBLIC ISSUES. 
The Court of Appeals held that evidence that editor 
Goodey's knowledge that one of Guldan's sources for the "munici-
pal power" statements was plaintiff's political enemy" was 
probative on the issue of Goodey's actual malice. Reliance upon 
a potentially questionable source simply does not demonstrate 
subjective awareness of falsity or give rise to "serious doubts" 
concerning the accuracy of information in an article where a 
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reporter has consulted mult ip le sources . Secord v. Cockburn, 747 
F.Supp. 779, 794 (D. D.C. 1 9 9 1 ) . 1 5 Where, as in the ins tant 
case , a reporter r e l i e s upon severa l sources for a l l eged 
defamatory s tatements , the fac t that one of the sources i s the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s p o l i t i c a l enemy, i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to r a i s e the i n f e r -
ence that a reviewing ed i tor enterta ined ser ious doubts concern-
ing the accuracy of the s tatements . 
The Court of Appeals a l s o found that ed i tor Goodey's 
statements in h i s November column may be considered as evidence 
that he enterta ined ser ious doubts about the July a r t i c l e . I t i s 
"hornbook l i b e l law that p o s t - p u b l i c a t i o n events have no impact 
whatever on actual malice" because the e x i s t e n c e or non-ex i s tence 
of malice must be determined as of the date of p u b l i c a t i o n . 
Secord, supra at 792; see a l s o , Rueber v. Food Chemical News, 925 
J
--
D
 In Secord. the court held that re l iance upon a convicted fe lon was not 
evidence of actual malice absent an addit ional showing of surrounding circum-
stances that re l iance upon a part i cu lar fe lon would c o n s t i t u t e reck less d i sre -
gard for the truth. See a l s o . Janklow v. Viking Press . 459 N.W.2d 415, 421 
(S.D. 1991) (evidence that two of defendant's sources were convicted fe lons 
with obvious motives to defame p l a i n t i f f was properly disregarded on summary 
judgment on the i s sue of actual malice where other sources confirmed a l l eged 
inaccurac ies ) ; Perk v . Reader's Digest A s s o c . 931 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(where several sources supported a l l e g e d l y defamatory a s ser t ions that mayor 
was f i s c a l l y i rrespons ib l e , evidence that one source was biased against mayor 
and another contradicted the a s ser t ions was i n s u f f i c i e n t to defeat magazine' s 
motion for summary judgment). 
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F.2d 703, 716-17 (4th Cir . 1991). The Court of Appeals improp-
er ly considered evidence in Goodey's a r t i c l e wr i t ten in November 
as re levant to h i s s t a t e of mind a t the time of publ ica t ion five 
months e a r l i e r . 
CONCLUSION 
I t i s abundantly c lear t ha t t h i s panel of the Court of 
Appeals, in balancing the repu ta t iona l and free press sca les , 
places a heavy thumb on the s ide of repu ta t iona l i n t e r e s t s . The 
pane l ' s low value placed on free press i n t e r e s t s runs counter to 
the decis ions of the U.S. Supreme Court and t h i s Court. Cer t io -
r a r i review i s warranted and necessary to r e s to r e proper balance. 
DATED t h i s \*-\\ day of June, 1992. 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P e t i t i o n e r s 
i b
 In Rueber. the court held that an e d i t o r ' s testimony at t r i a l that she 
would have printed the allegedly defamatory a r t i c l e even if she knew some of 
the a l legat ions contained therein were false was i r re levant because i t had no 
bearing on her s t a t e of mind at the time of publicat ion. Id. 
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Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Terry West appeals the dismissal of his libel claims against 
the defendants. West brought suit for statements made in three 
different articles published in The Daily Spectrum newspaper. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Appellee Rick Guldan, a reporter for The Daily Spectrum, 
wrote two articles that were critical of West, the mayor of the 
small Utah town of La Verkin. Among other accusations and 
criticisms, the articles criticized West for opposing the 
purchase of a municipal power plant by the town before his 
election, but then reversing his position once elected. The 
trial court found that the articles implied that West adopted the 
politically popular view in order to get elected and that the 
connotation of the articles was that West was Ma liar and the 
worst kind of political cheat." 
In his first article, Guldan also questioned West's ability 
to "keep the facts straight. " Guldan reported that when there 
had been a break-in at a business owned by West, West had 
initially told the police that nothing was missing, but the 
police report subsequently indicated that several rugs valued at 
approximately $7,000 had been taken. West's insurance claim, 
according to Guldan, valued the rugs at approximately $13,000. 
The trial court found that the story implied that West filed a 
fraudulent insurance claim. 
Following publication of the first article, West met with 
the publisher of the paper, appellee Don Hogun, and challenged 
the factual accuracy of the article. In particular, he stated 
that he had always supported municipal power and that prior to 
the election he had sent to the citizens of La Verkin a letter 
indicating his support. Hogun was provided with a copy of the 
letter to the citizens. West also gave Hogun a rebuttal "letter 
to the editor" challenging the many issues raised in Guldan's 
article. 
Hogun consulted the paper's local counsel who indicated that 
the story about the insurance claim was actionable because it was 
factual and therefore warranted a retraction if false, but that 
the statements regarding West's position on municipal power 
constituted protected opinion and no retraction was necessary, 
even if the statements were false. 
The Daily Spectrum then ran a retraction of the story 
involving the $13,000 insurance claim but did not retract its 
statements concerning West's change in position on municipal 
power. Instead, Guldan wrote a second article challenging the 
points addressed in West's rebuttal letter which was published in 
the letters to the editor section that same day. In particular, 
Guldan asserted that if West was not in fact opposed to municipal 
power prior to the election, then he "certainly did a masterful 
job of creating an illusion he was." 
Several months following publication of the foregoing 
articles, appellee Brent Goodey, the managing editor of The Daily 
Spectrum, wrote an article titled "How I came to %love' La 
Verkin's mayor." Goodey indicated his frustration with West and 
La Verkin's planning commission chairman, Phil Phillips, whom 
Goodey portrayed as West's "political enemy." Goodey accused 
them both of "repeated, and not too subtle attempts to manipulate 
the press." Goodey then recounted the efforts of both West and 
Phillips to have the paper publish their versions of events in La 
Verkin politics. 
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West brought suit for the statements regarding his purported 
change in position on municipal power, the insurance claim story, 
and the charge of attempting to manipulate the press. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Part of this case comes to us as an appeal of a summary 
judgment granted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
Our standard of review when considering 
challenges to a summary judgment is settled. 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In determining 
whether the trial court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact, 
we view the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. And in deciding whether the 
trial court properly granted judgment as a 
matter of law to the prevailing party, we 
give no deference to the trial court's view 
of the law; we review it for correctness. 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Furthermore, ,f[w]e 
accord no deference to the trial court's conclusion that the 
facts are not in dispute . . . ." Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 
P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
The remainder of the case comes to us as an appeal from a 
dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where 
it clearly appears that the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief 
under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts they could prove to support their 
claim. In determining whether the trial 
court properly granted the motion, we must 
accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Prows v. Department of Financial Insts.. 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 
1991) (citations omitted). 
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RULE 54(b) 
The claim against Guldan regarding his initial insurance 
story remains before the trial court,1 The trial court certified 
all other claims as final and appealable under rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 If a trial court improperly 
grants rule 54(b) certification, however, this court does not 
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Kennecott Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991). Since 
the propriety of rule 54(b) certification presents a 
jurisdictional question, we raise it sua sponte. Id..3 Whether 
an order is eligible for rule 54(b) certification is a question 
of law that we review for correctness. Id. 
Our first inquiry is whether the claims against Guldan for 
his municipal power statements constitute claims that are 
separate from the claim against Guldan for the erroneous 
insurance story. In Kennecott, the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the Seventh Circuit's approach for determining whether there are 
multiple claims. See Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1104. In simplified 
1. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that Guldan's 
statements in his second article regarding the initial insurance 
story were not defamatory. Inasmuch as West does not address 
this ruling in his briefs, we assume that he is not appealing it 
and we do not address it. 
2. Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part: 
When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. 
3. In light of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decisions 
rejecting rule 54(b) certifications, see Bennion v. Pennzoil, 826 
P.2d 137 (Utah 1992); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank. 823 P.2d 
1065 (Utah 1992); Webb v. Vantage Income Properties. 818 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co.. 818 P.2d 2 
(Utah 1991), we requested additional briefing from the parties. 
Even though parties may have a rule 54(b) certification from the 
trial court, they typically should include in their briefs a 
short discussion on the propriety of the certification in order 
to assist the appellate court in determining jurisdiction. 
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terms, the inquiry is whether there is a substantial factual 
overlap between the issues certified for appeal and the issues 
remaining before the trial court. The supreme court indicated 
that this inquiry may generally be satisfied by determining 
whether the resolution of an issue on appeal would constitute res 
judicata of an issue remaining below. Id. at 1104-05. 
The substance of West's lawsuit is that Guldan defamed him 
several times. West's multiple claims, therefore, are not simply 
multiple legal theories being applied to the same act. Cf. 
Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1100. Each alleged defamation is a 
separate injury giving rise to a separate and distinct claim. 
The resolution of a given libel claim arising from one statement 
would not have a res judicata effect on the other libel claims 
arising from the other statements. The claims against Guldan 
arising from the municipal power statements may therefore 
properly be severed from the insurance claim that remains below. 
The claims against Hogun and Goodey are also properly before 
us, but for a different reason. Rule 54(b) provides that if 
multiple parties are involved, the trial court may "direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all 
. . . the parties." The supreme court's recent analysis 
regarding the separateness of claims simply does not apply to the 
certification of final judgments against separate parties. There 
is no dispute as to whether Hogun and Goodey are separate 
parties. All claims against them are final and they have no 
unresolved matters remaining below. They are therefore entitled, 
under rule 54(b), to have the appeals brought against them 
decided now so that their legal status is not suspended 
indefinitely due to the pendency of the matter remaining below. 
ANALYSIS 
Opinion Privilege 
In both of Guldan's articles he accused West of changing his 
position on whether La Verkin should purchase its own power 
plant. The first article contained the following: 
Terry West says the city council should 
listen to the people. The people spoke last 
November in a general election on the issue 
of municipal power. The people said they 
didn't want it, and Terry West, when running 
for mayor, was opposed to it. However, the 
first thing West did as mayor was ignore the 
wishes of the people (claiming they weren't 
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qualified to make that decision) and 
reactivated the municipal power issue. 
Apparently West believes you should only 
listen to the people when they agree with 
you. 
In the second article, Guldan stated the following regarding 
the municipal power issue: 
I said Mayor West had been opposed to 
municipal power during the election. The 
mayor claims he never took that position. 
Several La Verkin citizens, however, have 
told me that prior to the election they were 
under the impression West was opposed to 
municipal power, which is why they voted for 
him. 
Phil Phillips, who serves as chairman of 
the planning and zoning commission, said West 
came to him after the election and said he 
was changing his position on municipal power 
and would support it. If West never actually 
came out before the election and said he was 
opposed to municipal power, he certainly did 
a masterful job of creating an illusion he 
was. 
Despite the trial court's conclusion that the statements 
were actionable because they could be found defamatory,4 it 
4. Defendants asserted below that these statements could not be 
found defamatory by a reasonable jury. By considering the 
environment in which the statements were made, the trial court 
correctly ruled otherwise. 
Of course, to determine whether or not the 
statement is defamatory one must consider the 
statement and its meaning in the context in 
which the statement was made and not in a 
vacuum. This allegation of a change of 
position was made following a hotly contested 
election in a small community where 
candidates lost or won depending upon their 
announced position regarding municipal power. 
The voters had, prior to the election, 
expressed their opposition to the acquisition 
of a power distribution system by the City of 
La Verkin. The voters were therefore likely 
to elect those whose [sic] shared the 
(continued...) 
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granted partial summary judgment to Guldan, ruling that his 
municipal power comments were absolutely protected under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 
The trial court applied Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 
U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990), in ruling that Guldan's 
comments were constitutionally privileged. In Milkovich. the 
Supreme Court effectively eliminated any claimed or perceived 
constitutional privilege for "opinion" while creating a new 
analytical framework for applying the right to free speech as a 
4. (... .continued) 
opposition espoused by the majority. Under 
those circumstances, it is clear that a 
candidate who would espouse opposition to 
municipal power to get elected and then 
immediately pursue a pro-municipal power 
agenda as Mayor of the city would be viewed 
as a liar and the worst kind of political 
cheat. To suggest that those who trusted 
such a man and voted for him because of his 
announced intentions would not, following his 
change of heart, have at least contempt for 
him borders on the ridiculous. The 
statements of the defendants, if made as 
assertions of fact, falsely and with actual 
malice, would clearly be defamatory as they 
would hold the plaintiff up to contempt, 
hatred, and ridicule in his community. 
5. Defendants, joined by amicus curiae Society of Professional 
Journalists, urge this court to adopt an opinion privilege under 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution. It appears 
from a review of the record, however, that defendant did not 
raise this state constitutional argument below. "[W]e generally 
will not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the 
appellant raises on appeal for the first time.11 State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). ,f[T]he proper forum in which 
to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state 
constitutional interpretation is before the trial court, not, as 
typically happens . . . for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). §eg also Zions First 
Nat. Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 
1988) ("great benefit" may be derived from trial court's view on 
legal issues). Inasmuch as defendants' state constitutional 
arguments do not qualify for any of the exceptions to this 
general rule, see State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
App. 1991), we do not address them. They may, however, properly 
be addressed on remand. 
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shield against libel suits. West asserts that the trial court 
misapplied Milkovich and that Guldan's comments are not 
absolutely privileged. We agree. 
In Milkovich. a newspaper reporter implied that a wrestling 
coach, Michael Milkovich, had committed perjury about a fight 
during a wrestling match between his home team of Maple Heights 
High School and the visiting team from Mentor High School. 
Following the altercation, the Ohio High School Athletic 
Association (OHSAA) conducted a hearing. OHSAA placed the Maple 
Heights team on probation for a year and declared the team 
ineligible for the next state tournament. Several parents and 
wrestlers sued in state court for a restraining order against 
OHSAA's ruling. Milkovich testified in the state court 
proceeding. The trial court enjoined OHSAA's ruling on due 
process grounds. 
The next day, a column appeared in the local newspaper with 
the heading, "Maple beat the law with the xbig lie.,H Id. at 
2698. The column implied that Milkovich had committed perjury in 
the state proceedings. "Anyone who attended the meet, whether he 
be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or [an] impartial observer, knows 
in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after 
each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." Id. 
(quoting Milkovich v. The News-Herald. 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21, 
545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321-22 (1989)). 
Milkovich brought suit against the reporter and the 
newspaper. After the case had made several trips up and down the 
appellate ladder, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review 
"the Ohio courts' recognition of a constitutionally-required 
^opinion' exception to the application of its defamation laws." 
Id. at 2701. 
The defendants in Milkovich relied upon the following dicta 
appearing in Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 
2997 (1974), for the proposition that opinion is absolutely 
protected by the First Amendment. "Under the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an 
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas." 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S. Ct. at 3007 (footnote 
omitted). 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the foregoing quote from 
Gertz was merely a "reiteration of Justice Holmes' classic 
xmarketplace of ideas' concept," see Abrams v. United 
States. 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S. Ct. 17, 22 (1919) (Holmes, J. 
dissenting), and that the term "opinion" in the second sentence 
should be equated with the term "idea" in the first. Therefore, 
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the Court concluded, "we do not think this passage from Gertz was 
intended to create a wholesale defamation exception for anything 
that might be labeled ^opinion.'" Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705. 
In rejecting any "opinion" privilege, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that an unqualified opinion privilege would disrupt the 
delicate balance between the constitutional need for vigorous 
public debate and the legitimate state interests in protecting 
personal reputations. 
[W]e think the " *breathing space/M which 
"*freedoms of expression require in order to 
survive,'" Hepps. 475 U.S., at 772, 106 
S.Ct., at 1561 (quoting New York Times, 376 
U.S., at 272, 84 S.Ct., at 721), is 
adequately secured by existing constitutional 
doctrine without the creation of an 
artificial dichotomy between "opinion" and 
fact. 
Id. at 2706.6 
The Supreme Court also reasoned that a wholesale exception 
for opinions would ignore the fact that "expressions of Opinion' 
may often imply an assertion of objective fact," id. at 2705, and 
gave the following example: 
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John 
Jones is a liar," he implies a knowledge of 
facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones 
told an untruth. Even if the speaker states 
the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if 
those facts are either incorrect or 
6. The Utah Supreme Court has echoed the same thought: 
The need to provide the media with a margin 
for error is most clear and compelling in 
cases involving public officials and public 
figures. The requirement of actual malice in 
the constitutional sense provides that margin 
for error which permits the freest flow of 
infQnp^tjon UKelv tg be of importance %n 
deciding matters of public import, without 
extinguishing all protection for reputational 
interests. 
Seegmiller v. KSL. Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981) (emphasis 
added). Seg also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1988) 
(Free speech does not "always prevail against all other values, 
such as those protected by the state law of defamation."). 
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incomplete, or if his assessment of them is 
erroneous, the statement may still imply a 
false assertion of fact. Simply couching 
such statements in terms of opinion does not 
dispel these implications; and the statement, 
"In my opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as 
much damage to reputation as the statement, 
"Jones is a liar." 
Id. at 2705-06. 
The Supreme Court's emphasis on whether a statement implies 
a false fact when criticizing an individual indicates that there 
is a significant difference between (1) criticizing an 
individual's actions, and (2) falsely reporting an individual's 
actions. The former is constitutionally protected speech, the 
latter is not. ,f[T]here is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless 
error materially advances society's interest in ^uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open debate on public issues.'" Gertz, 418 U.S. 
at 340, 94 S. Ct. at 3007. 
The Supreme Court's test in Milkovich for whether a 
statement, or the connotation of a statement, is actionable is 
quite simple: it is actionable if the statement is "sufficiently 
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false." 
Milkovich. 110 S. Ct. at 2707. In applying the Milkovich test to 
the present case, we must determine whether the connotation that 
West opposed municipal power in order to be elected was 
sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proven false. 
Guldan's criticism of West is unequivocally based on the 
implied factual assertion that West opposed municipal power 
before the election. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning from 
Milkovich. we conclude that if the underlying factual assertion 
that West opposed municipal power prior to the election is false, 
then the assertion that he opposed municipal power prior to the 
election in order to get elected must also be false. 
The trial court erroneously reasoned that since only West 
could truly know his position before the election, Guldan's 
report of his change in position could not be proven true or 
false.7 The trial court failed to recognize that it is West's 
7. The trial court ruled that Guldan's comments were his 
"interpretation" of the pre-election position of the Mayor and 
were therefore "opinion." Such a conclusion is directly contrary 
to Guldan's own portrayal in his second article of his earlier 
(continued...) 
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public position, not his private view, that is at issue. West's 
public position is an objectively verifiable fact. At trial, 
West may present his evidence to show his public support of the 
project; defendants may then present their evidence to prove his 
public opposition to municipal power. The jury must then 
determine whether West supported or opposed municipal power prior 
to the election. 
West presented to the trial court a group of letters which 
had been sent to all citizens of La Verkin prior to the election. 
The main letter weighed the pros and cons of municipal power and 
concluded: "With all this in mind and after studying the many 
good arguments on both sides of the issue . . . we feel that we 
should purchase the power system." The letter is signed by Mayor 
West along with several other members of the city council who 
supported the purchase. Letters were also included in the packet 
from council members who opposed municipal power. The trial 
court ruled that the letter was insufficient to raise a question 
as to whether West in fact opposed municipal power before the 
election. Such a conclusion was incorrect. The letter clearly 
indicates that West was taking a pro-municipal power position 
before the election. The letter therefore creates a material 
question of fact as to West's pre-election position. 
We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
connotations of Guldan's comments were not factual enough to be 
susceptible of being proven as true or false. Either West did, 
or he did not, publicly oppose municipal power prior to the 
election. If he did not oppose municipal power, then it cannot 
truthfully be said that he opposed it for political gain. If a 
jury finds that West publicly opposed municipal power prior to 
the election, West will have failed to prove that the statements 
were in fact false and his libel claim will fail. If, on the 
other hand, a jury concludes that West publicly and consistently 
supported municipal power prior to the election, then any 
connotation in Guldan's articles that he opposed municipal power 
in order to get elected would, as a matter of logic, be proven 
false. 
7. (...continued) 
statements• 
In my last column, I addressed areas of 
concern I had about the Mayor's actions. I 
believe I addressed them in a singularly 
unopinionated format. All I have done is 
presented the facts which were available to 
me, and left any conclusions to the reader. 
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Since it is possible for the connotation of Guldan's 
articles to be proven false by proving the underlying factual 
assertion false, we hold that Guldan's articles are actionable. 
The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. 
Even though we reverse the summary judgment because Guldan's 
articles were not absolutely privileged as "opinion," we 
emphasize that they are protected under the Supreme Court's 
traditional First Amendment analysis. West must therefore still 
prove on remand that Guldan acted with actual malice. 
Actual Malice 
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants Hogun 
and Goodey because it concluded that no jury could find that they 
published the Guldan articles with "actual malice." The 
constitutional requirement of "actual malice" requires that the 
plaintiff prove that the publisher of the statement either knew 
the statement was false or had a reckless disregard for the truth 
of the statement. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 279-
80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964). 
As to Guldan's first article, West asserts that the failure 
of Hogun and Goodey to investigate its accuracy prior to 
publication evidenced a reckless disregard for the truth. Hogun 
and Goodey assert that they had no duty to investigate before 
publishing because it was permissible for them to accept Guldan's 
article as true. Whether Hogun and Goodey had a duty to 
investigate the accuracy of Guldan's article is determined by 
their subjective mindsets in publishing. 
[The] cases are clear that reckless conduct 
is not measured by whether a reasonably 
prudent man would have published, or would 
have investigated before publishing. There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of 
his publications. Publishing with such 
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or 
falsity and demonstrates actual malice. 
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325 
(1968). 
West had the burden to produce evidence showing that Hogun 
and Goodey had "serious doubts" as to the accuracy of Guldan's 
articles. After reviewing the record, we are unconvinced that 
West ever made such a showing as to the first article. Hogun 
never read the first article before publishing and Goodey 
indicated that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the 
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article. West offered no evidence to contradict their claims. 
We therefore affirm the granting of summary judgment in favor of 
Hogun and Goodey regarding Guldan's first article. 
We reverse, however, as to the second article. West claims 
that circumstantial evidence proves that Hogun and Goodey had 
"serious doubts" as to the truth of Guldan's second article. 
West argues that once he informed Hogun of the inaccuracies in 
the first article and provided him a copy of his pre-election 
letter showing his support of municipal power, and once Hogun 
informed Goodey of West's complaints, Hogun and Goodey would have 
had serious doubts.8 Defendants maintain that such 
circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove actual malice. 
We disagree. 
The subjective determination of whether [a 
defendant] in fact entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of the statement may be 
proved by inference, as it would be rare for 
a defendant to admit such doubts. A court 
typically will infer actual malice from 
objective facts. These facts should provide 
evidence of negligence, motive, and intent 
such that an accumulation of the evidence and 
appropriate inferences supports the existence 
of actual malice. 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d 189, 196 
(1st Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) aff'd. 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. 
Ct. 1949 (1984). 
Hogun contends that the following undisputed facts demand 
summary judgment because they negate any reasonable likelihood 
that a jury could find that he acted with actual malice. First, 
Hogun did not review the second article. Second, Hogun consulted 
his managing editor and outside legal counsel. Finally, based on 
advice of legal counsel, Hogun (a) caused a retraction of the 
insurance statement because counsel advised that it was the only 
false factual statement, (b) caused West's letter refuting 
Guldan's initial accusations to be published, (c) undertook no 
further investigation of the matter, and (d) instructed legal 
counsel and managing editor to review Guldan's second article 
before publication. 
8. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130, 157-58, 87 
S. Ct. 1975, 1992-93 (1967) (article was published with little 
initial investigatory effort and after plaintiff had notified 
defendant that story was inaccurate). 
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Hogun's assertion that the foregoing facts demand summary 
judgment is erroneous. While they might be persuasive to a jury, 
they do not support a motion for summary judgment because they do 
not foreclose the possibility that a jury might find actual 
malice. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. Ml U.S. 242, 249, 
106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970) (moving party must "foreclose 
[] the possibility of the existence of certain facts" from which 
the jury could infer a conspiracy)). 
West asserts that alternative inferences arising from the 
same evidence tend to show that Hogun entertained serious doubts. 
For example: Hogun would not have consulted legal counsel if he 
did not have serious doubts; Hogun's knowledge that the insurance 
story was inaccurate would cause him to doubt the accuracy of the 
rest of the article; Hogun would have stood by the first article 
without publishing West's rebuttal letter if Hogun did not have 
serious doubts; Hogun's failure to investigate further or review 
the second article was an attempt to protect himself from suit; 
Hogun instructed his legal counsel and managing editor to review 
the second article because he had serious doubts about what 
Guldan might write given the inaccuracies in the first article. 
West also asserts that Hogun's investigation and retraction 
of the insurance story due to legal advice that it was the only 
actionable statement shows a reckless disregard for truth. 
According to West, Hogun only did what was necessary to avoid 
legal action, while disregarding the truth or falsity of the 
other statements. West also points to Hogun's failure to cause 
his pre-election letter to the citizens to be mentioned in the 
second article as a deliberate attempt to avoid any indication 
that the initial article was erroneous. The foregoing 
inferences, while clearly debatable, appear reasonable and 
therefore create a disputed question of fact. 
Goodey similarly asserts that the following facts negate the 
possibility that a jury would find that he acted with actual 
malice: (1) Goodey believed, based on his own editorial judgment 
and the advice of legal counsel, that Guldan's article merely 
reflected Guldan's opinion; (2) based on legal advice, Goodey 
believed that the appropriate response was to print West's letter 
containing his "opinions," let Guldan respond with his 
"opinions," and let the readers draw their own conclusions; and 
(3) based on legal advice, Goodey made no further investigation. 
Once again, the foregoing facts do not preclude a jury from 
finding actual malice. They are simply persuasive of Goodey's 
position. Whether or not Goodey thought the statements were 
legally protected opinion, and whether Goodey thought that the 
appropriate response would be to publish West's letter and 
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Guldan's response, are immaterial facts in determining whether he 
had serious doubts as to the statements' actual truth. 
Also, whether Goodey relied on the advice of legal counsel in 
deciding not to investigate further is immaterial to the question 
of whether he personally had serious doubts as to the accuracy of 
Guldan's accusations.9 
West asserts that Goodey must have had serious doubts about 
the accuracy of Guldan's report once he learned that Phil 
Phillips was the source of the municipal power statements. As 
Goodey himself wrote in the third article, Phillips was West's 
"political enemy." Goodey himself accused Phillips of repeated 
attempts to manipulate the press, and of trying to "nail" Mayor 
West based on "unsubstantiated comments." West argues that 
Goodey must have known Phillips was an unreliable source and that 
further investigation was necessary.10 
Viewing the accumulation of circumstantial evidence and the 
possible inferences in favor of West, we conclude that Hogun and 
Goodey were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law.11 Hogun and Goodey did not foreclose the possibility of a 
9. We reject any argument that reliance upon legal counsel 
somehow shields a defendant from a defamation suit. Reliance 
upon legal counsel simply does not figure into the constitutional 
formula created by the Supreme Court. The proper focus is on a 
defendant's efforts to publish the truth, not the defendant's 
efforts to avoid legal liability. One's reliance upon legal 
advice as to what course of action should be followed to avoid 
legal consequences, simply does not prevent a plaintiff from 
proving that the publisher had "serious doubts" about the 
statement when it was published. 
10. "[Rjecklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons 
to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his 
reports." St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S. Ct. at 1326. See, 
e.g., Curtis Publishing CQw 388 U.S. at 157-58, 87 S. Ct. at 
1992-93 (defamatory matter, which was not "hot news," from 
suspect source was printed without substantial independent 
support); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co.. 240 S.E.2d 812, 815 
(S.C.) cert, denied, 436 U.S. 945, 98 S. Ct. 2847 (1978) (author 
published article after being told that the information provided 
by informant, the respondent's former sister-in-law, was "biased, 
unreliable, and untrue, and that the publication of the article 
would damage respondent"). 
11. Defendants urge this Court to depart from our traditional 
summary judgment analysis when free speech is involved. They 
(continued*..) 
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jury finding that they acted with actual malice. They presented 
evidence which could support a jury's finding in their favor, but 
the evidence does not mandate such a finding. Whether or not 
Hogun and Goodey had actual malice in allowing the publication of 
the municipal power statements in the second article therefore 
remains a material disputed fact and summary judgment was 
improper. 
Manipulation of the Press 
The third article in this case, "How I came to xlove' La 
Verkin's mayor," was written by Goodey. He discussed the ongoing 
political conflict between Mayor West and Phil Phillips, the 
chairman of La Verkin's planning commission. Goodey wrote: "The 
problem I have with the two gentlemen is their repeated, and not 
too subtle attempts to manipulate the press." Goodey then 
recounted several attempts by West and Phillips to get their 
versions of La Verkin politics printed. The article also related 
11. (...continued) 
urge us to adopt the federal civil procedure requirement that a 
libel plaintiff produce "clear and convincing" evidence that the 
defendants acted with actual malice. See Anderson. 477 U.S. at 
254, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. We decline defendants/ invitation since 
the inconsistent analysis set forth in Anderson requires trial 
courts to weigh the evidence while at the same time prohibiting a 
weighing of the evidence. See id. at 265-66, 106 S. Ct. at 2519 
(Brennan, J. dissenting). We also decline to provide special 
procedural requirements for libel defendants in addition to the 
substantive constitutional protections. See id. at 268-69, 106 
S. Ct. at 2520-21 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Contrary to the 
dissent's assertion, the Utah Supreme Court did not approve the 
Anderson analysis in Cox. 761 P.2d at 561. The supreme court 
acknowledged the preference for resolving defamation claims on 
the pleadings where appropriate, as indicated in Anderson. and 
then stated, •• [nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to 
dismiss the defamation claim on the grounds discussed above." 
I£. The standard of review analysis set forth in Anderson was 
never even discussed. 
Even if we were to adopt the federal approach set forth in 
Anderson, it would not alter the result of this appeal. As the 
Supreme Court itself said, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is 
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in 
his favor," Anderson. 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513, and 
"the plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only 
present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his 
favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that 
requires a trial." Id. at 257, 106 S. Ct. at 2514 (emphasis 
added). Such a standard has been met here. 
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how each accused the newspaper of covering up the errors of the 
other. 
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss all 
claims relating to the third article because it found that the 
statements were not, as a matter of law, libelous. Libel is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1988) as follows: 
"Libel" means a malicious defamation, 
expressed either by printing or by signs or 
pictures or the like, tending to blacken the 
memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the 
honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or 
publish the natural defects of one who is 
alive, and thereby expose him to public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule. 
A trial court has a duty in a libel case to make a 
preliminary determination whether the communication could be 
considered defamatory. 
Whether the publication of an alleged 
defamatory statement . . . is capable of 
conveying a defamatory message is initially a 
question of law. 
The tort of defamation protects only 
reputation. A publication is not defamatory 
simply because it is nettlesome or 
embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because 
it makes a false statement about the 
plaintiff. Thus, an embarrassing, even 
though false, statement that does not damage 
one's reputation is not actionable as libel 
or slander. If no defamatory meaning can 
reasonably be inferred by reasonable persons 
from the communication, the action must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Only 
if a court first determines that a 
publication might be considered defamatory by 
a reasonable person is there a fact issue for 
the trier of fact. 
Cox v. Hatch. 763 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
The trial court concluded in the present case that "the 
charge of manipulation of the press could not possibly give rise 
to a defamatory meaning in the minds of reasonable jurors.'1 We 
disagree. The term "manipulate11 clearly has a possible negative 
connotation. One of its definitions is "to control, manage or 
play upon by artful, unfair or insidious means especially to 
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one's own advantage.M Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (unabridged) 1376 (1986)• "Manipulation" is defined 
as "management with use of unfair, scheming or underhanded 
methods especially for one's own advantage <swing the balance of 
political power . • . by manipulation —Paul Blanshard> 
manipulation is one of the dirtiest words in the new lexicon — 
W.H.Whyte>." Id. 
Inherent in the accusation that West repeatedly attempted to 
manipulate the local press, and in the conduct reported, is the 
connotation that West did so in order to control the information 
disseminated to the public. While reasonable persons might 
debate whether such a connotation impeaches West's honesty, 
integrity, and reputation and whether it holds him up to public 
hatred, ridicule, or contempt, the possibility of the debate 
requires a ruling in West's favor.12 Since it is debatable 
whether the accusation was defamatory, we must draw the inference 
in West's favor and conclude that a reasonable juror might 
consider the accusation defamatory. See Cox, 763 P.2d at 561. 
We therefore hold that Goodey's article is actionable as libelous 
and the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to 
dismiss.13 
CONCLUSION 
With regard to defendant Guldan: The summary judgment as it 
relates to the municipal power statements made in both the first 
and second articles is reversed and remanded. 
12. The dissent asserts that it is a "mainstream public 
expectation" that politicians would attempt to manipulate the 
press. We do not share such a cynical opinion. Nevertheless, 
the point is that it is the duty of the jury to determine, given 
the political climate and the totality of the circumstances in 
their community, whether the accusation of manipulating their 
local press in fact held West up to public hatred, ridicule, or 
contempt in their community. Only the jury can make such a 
determination and we are not justified in removing it from them 
based on our own personal views and expectations of politicians. 
13. In holding that such statements may be found to be 
defamatory by a jury, we do not imply that West must prevail on 
remand. We are only holding that the legal threshold of 
defamation has been crossed and whether or not the statements are 
in fact defamatory must be decided at trial. The defenses that 
may be raised by defendants, such as truth and the absence of 
actual malice, are also questions of fact that remain to be 
determined at trial. 
910066-CA 18 
With regard to defendants Hogun and Goodey: The summary 
judgment as it relates to the first article is affirmed; the 
summary judgment as it relates to the municipal power statements 
made in the second article, however, is reversed and remanded; 
the dismissal of the cause of action arising from the third 
article regarding manipulation of the press is also reversed and 
remanded. 
&^CC 10, %£~J\ 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
GARFF, Judge (dissenting): 
I dissent. I would not reach either the state or federal 
constitutional issues, but would affirm the judgment on the 
ground that the statements are not defamatory as a matter of law 
because they do not "impeach [West's] honesty, integrity, virtue, 
or reputation or publish his . . . natural defects or expose him 
. . . to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Cox v. Hatch. 
761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988); Utah Code Ann. S 45-2-2(1) (1988). 
"Whether the publication of an alleged defamatory statement 
. . . is capable of conveying a defamatory message is initially a 
question of law." Cox, 761 P.2d at 561. Thus a trial court's 
first task is to determine whether, as a matter of law, a 
statement was capable of conveying a defamatory message, id. On 
appeal, we review independently this initial legal determination. 
Cox is directly on point. Similar to the present case, the 
plaintiffs in Cox appealed a dismissal of their defamation claim. 
The alleged defamatory statement was a photograph published in 
Orrin Hatch's campaign literature during his 1982 campaign for 
reelection to the United States Senate. Plaintiffs were 
employees of the United States Postal Service and were members of 
the American Postal Workers Union. The photo portrayed Hatch 
talking to plaintiffs at their place of employment. The photo 
was included in an eight-page political flier entitled "Senator 
Orrin Hatch Labor Letter," distributed by Hatch's "Union Members 
for Hatch Committee." Plaintiffs allege the photo defamed them 
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because it implied they endorsed Hatch for reelection and that 
they were Republicans. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in part 
because the implications that plaintiffs were Republican or that 
they supported Hatch were not defamatory as a matter of law. Id. 
at 562. The court held that "attribution of membership in a 
political party in the United States that is a mainstream party 
and not at odds with the fundamental social order is not 
defamatory." Id. The court further held that "attribution of 
support for a candidate from one of those parties" is not 
defamatory. Id; see also, Frinzi v. Hanson. 140 N.W.2d 259, 262 
(Wis. 1966) ("Being charged with being a good, luke warm or 
nonmember of a political party is not libelous."). The court in 
Cox concluded: 
However offensive the photograph in this case 
may have been to the plaintiffs, it could 
not, as a matter of law, have damaged their 
reputations or subjected them to "public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule." In sum, the 
complaint failed to state a claim for relief 
based on defamation. 
Cox. 761 P.2d at 562. 
Cox noted, with approval, other cases which held that 
statements regarding political positions or affiliations were not 
defamatory as a matter of law. Id. at 562; see, e.g.. Frinzi. 
140 N.W.2d at 262 (accusation by Democratic Party Chair that 
Democratic candidate was endorsed by certain Republicans who 
supported weakening anti-gambling laws, and that candidate 
considered running as an Independent not defamatory as a matter 
of law); Rawlins v. McKee. 327 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1959) (per curiam) (accusation that political candidate was 
radical who was financed by labor bosses not defamatory as a 
matter of law); Manasco v. Walley. 63 So. 2d 91, 95 (Miss. 1953) 
(statement that candidate for reelection to the house lost 
funding for state roads by removing them from priority list not 
defamatory as a matter of law). 
Other cases have likewise held that accusations alleging 
mainstream political positions or activities are not defamatory 
as a matter of law. See, e.g. . Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 
529 P.2d 863, 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (fluoridation); Shields 
v. Booles. 38 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931) (pro parimutuel 
law) . 
Here, the trial court concluded the articles were capable of 
conveying the message that West was "a liar and the worst kind of 
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political cheat," This conclusion greatly exaggerates the import 
of the statements and is erroneous as a matter of law. 
Municipal power is clearly a matter of public concern. 
"Communications to voters by an elected official . . . which 
appropriately pertain to a political campaign are a matter of 
public interest." Cox, 761 P.2d at 560. The statements 
regarding West's position on municipal power do not directly 
imply West intended to deceive voters, nor do they imply he lied 
about his prior position. The statements say only that his 
position changed after the election. Moreover, any position, or 
change of position, regarding municipal power is a mainstream 
political position and not "at odds with the fundamental social 
order." Id. at 562. Thus, the statements are not defamatory as 
a matter of law. 
Neither is the accusation that West attempted to manipulate 
the press defamatory as a matter of law. The trial court 
correctly concluded that "the charge of manipulation of the press 
could not possibly give rise to a defamatory meaning in the minds 
of reasonable jurors." 
The majority claims the statement is actionable because 
there exists a "possibility of the debate" that an accusation of 
manipulation is defamatory. The majority, relying on a secondary 
definition in Webster's, found the sentence actionable because 
one of the many definitions of the word "manipulate" has a 
negative connotation. 
I disagree with this analysis. First, the same edition of 
Webster's provides other, preferential definitions of the word: 
"handle or manage esp. with skill or dexterity," "to treat or 
manage with the mind or intellect," "to control the action or 
course of by management: utilize by controlling and managing." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) 1376 
(1986). 
More importantly, the notion that West exercised power over 
the press is not, as a matter of law, defamatory. The accusation 
that a political leader or a political candidate would attempt to 
manage or to exercise influence over the press is a mainstream, 
public expectation and, again, is "not at odds with the 
fundamental social order," and thus is not defamatory. Cox. 761 
P.2d at 562. 
Courts have concluded that even stronger words used against 
political leaders and candidates are not actionable as a matter 
of law. ££S, 3,gT, Miskovskv v. Oklahoma Pub. Co.. 654 P.2d 587, 
594 (Okla.) ("scurrilous defamation" and "gutter theatrics" not 
actionable), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 923, 103 S. Ct. 235, reh'a 
910066-CA 21 
denied, 450 U.S. 1059, 103 S. Ct. 479 (1982); Good Gov't Group v. 
Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572, 576 (Cal.) ("recalcitrant," 
"machinations," "infamy" and so forth used against former city 
council member not actionable), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S. 
Ct. 2406 (1978). 
I also dissent as to the majority's rejection, in note 11 of 
its opinion, of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Anderson held that, in cases of summary 
dispositions involving libel, the plaintiff must produce clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with actual 
malice. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-54, 106 S. Ct. at 2512-13. 
This approach was acknowledged approvingly by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Cox, 761 P.2d at 561. The Cox court acknowledged "a 
First Amendment interest in disposing of libel cases on motion 
and at an early stage when it appears that a reasonable jury 
could not find for the plaintiffs." Id. 
In conclusion, I would affirm the trial court's summary 
judgmeijt^ enmiy dismissal on tjie ground that the statements are not 
a matter oj^ jfcw, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 4 5-2-
910066-CA 22 
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Appendix "B" 
Relevant Constitutional Provisions 
And Statutes 
Religious and Political Freedom 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
U.S. Const. Amend. 1 
Freedon of Speech and of the Press - Libel 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech or of the press. In all 
criminal prosecutions for liebel the truth may 
be given as evidence to the jury; and if it 
shall appear to the jury that the matter 
charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury 
shall have the right to determine the law and 
the fact. 
Utah Constitution Art. I, Sec. 15 
Libel and Slander Defined 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Libel" maens a malicious defamation, 
expressed either by printing or by signs or 
pictures or the like, tending to blacken the 
memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the 
honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or 
publish the natural defects of one who is 
alive, and thereby to expose him to public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1)(1991) 
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Turf battles can s\o 
Reporters are some of the most 
Jealous, and most paranoid people 
you would ever want to meet Collec-
tively, they have an ego the sue of 
the National Debt, and «IIMMI! as 
fragile 
One of the bigger problems 
resulting from this is "turf battles" 
which sometimes erupt over who 
should be covering a story 
Reporters are often suspicious, and 
even hostile if someone dares to 
violate the sanctity of their "heats" 
These battles cause us to lose sight 
of our common objective turning 
out a quality newspaper II shouldn i 
matter to a reporter who gets a 
story, as long as the pa|>cr gets it, in 
a timely fashion 
Sometimes communities have the 
same basic pioblems as reporters 
do Political infighting and bickering 
over real or imagined territorial 
rights can serve as a biuderance lo 
positive growth for the entire area 
A few years back, a lens and 
eyeglass manufa< tuicr was con 
sidenna relocating in southern Utah. 
They had three possible com-
munities in mind, and sent a team to 
investigate the feasabihty of such a 
move, according lo a sixtkesman for 
the company Ka<it of the three com 
munities however, apparently spent 
as much lime trying to put down the 
other two communities as they did 
trying to present themselves, and the 
region as a whole in a good light 
Thslr actions loft bad tested In tits 
mouths of the visitors The end result 
was that the three cunimunilics end 
ed up convincing the company not to 
relocate here at all 
"The local atmosphere was not 
conducive for us to make the move to 
Utah," the, spokesman said 
The company is now located In 
another state, and employs more 
than 100 people in good paying light 
manufacturing jobs. 
Rick 
Guidon 
At the paper, when the infighting 
and turf battles get out of hand, we 
have an editor who quickly puts 
issues, and people in their proper 
perspective Citizens should do the 
same with their community officials. 
We must learn to work together for 
the growth of the entire region 
Pray on it" is one of the favorite 
expressions of La Verkin Mayor 
Terry West 
Terry West claims l,a Verkin is his 
home, and he loves it. As mayor, he 
is constantly telling the citizens there 
Is a need to bring In business and im-
prove the tax base Yet he located his 
own business - which lie had every 
right to do — in Springdale, adding 
substantially to that community's 
tax base 
Terry West is a citizen of Utah lie 
has to be, he's mayor of a Utah city 
Yet Terry West refuses to get a Utah 
driver's license Mis reasoning is he 
wants to retain his Wyoming license 
(where he ssys he owns a home) so 
he won't lose his resident hunting 
privileges, even though he is no 
longer living in Wyoming. 
Terry West avoids paying for 
license plates, as you and I have to 
N growth 
do, by utilizing dealer plates from his 
Salt Lake City dealership Dealer 
plates are Intended for demonstrator 
t ars, and while West's use of them on 
his private vehicles may not violate 
the letter of the law. It certainly ap-
l>ears to violate the spirit of the law. 
Terry West says the city council 
should listen to the people The peo-
ple spoke last November in a general 
election on the issue of municipal 
power The people said they didn't 
want it, and Terry West, when runn-
ing for mayor, was opposed to it. 
However the first thing West did as 
mayor was ignore the wishes of the 
people (claiming they weren't 
qualified to make that decision) and 
reactivated the municipal power 
issue Apparently West believes you 
should only listen to the people when 
they agree with you Now that the 
police issue has beep dealt with, you 
tan be sure municipal power will 
rear its ugly head once again 
Terry West, who feels he is 
qualified to make a major decision 
based upon "the facts'* surrounding 
municipal power apparently has 
trouble keeping his own "facts" 
straight A case in point goes back to 
a break in at his store, Indian 
Village, on the night of Jan 2 Short 
ly after Washington County Sheriff'a 
Deputy Norm Swapp arrived, it waa 
believed nothing had been taken, 
that no entry of the building had been 
made However Swapp's report, filed 
Jan. 4 suddenly listed a loss of 
several rugs valued at nearly 17,000. 
And the insurance claim filed by the 
mayor was for more than $13,000. A 
classic case of not neccesarily keep-
ing one's "facts" straight 
At a recent city council meeting. 
of region 
West tried to iet a conditional use 
permit pushed through •Iter the 
regular meeting. The conditional use 
permit would nave granted a beer 
license to a newly opened local 
garage run by a friend of West's 
Whose interests is the mayor real-
ly representing? Pray on it. 
la Kfemorlam 
This is a tribute I meant to run in 
my column last week, but •pace 
limitations prevented me from doing 
so Louis L amour, one of the most 
prolific and entertaining authors of 
western novels, died recently froir 
lung cancer It somehow seems an 
unfitting end to a life which spanned 
eight decades, and produced more 
than 100 novels that have entertained 
generations and helped preserve a 
part of our heritage 
The popularity of L'Amour's works 
is attested by the fact his books have 
sold more than 200 million copies 
worldwide, and more than JO have 
been made into motion pictures, in 
eluding How the West w*s Won 
I enjoyed most of his works, having 
always looked forward to the 
publishing of each new book The 
legacy his words have left la great. 
but the loss his death has wrought is 
even greater. 
••••• 
CUDOS ANII ACCOLADES, at the 
request of fellow staff writer Loren 
Webb, to the St George Plannin 
Commission for understanding In* 
value of keeping people informed. 
They are great about notifying, well 
in advance, adjacent property 
owners of requested toning changes. 
It's too bad more communities don't 
make the same effort, to the same 
extent, as this august body does 
One mayor said go & one mayor said stay 
Editor'3 note: We are running Mr. 
UuUlans column on the same thy as 
the letter to the alitor from f a 
Verkm Mayor Terry West, to Mfttcft 
$t refers, ftn- the convenience of our 
rra«4rrs in cotnparmg the two sides 
of the issues mentioned It might pra-
te helpful to resd Mr West1* hotter 
first I on will find it untier the PuMic 
Forum heading. 
Mayor Terry West wrote a letter to 
the editor In response to my las! col-
umn (June 271 The mayor raises 
some issues In his letter which I 
would like to address lurther 
first, I was asked to leave a 
meeting in l a Verkin. hy M.iyor 
West who at the time was a little 
peeved over something else I liad 
written. I stayed, not because of any 
promises made to anybody, IKJI 
because Hurricane Mayor Dewey 
llardcastle threatened to leave I lie 
meeting II I wasn't allowed to May. 
The meeting was a closed meeling to 
discuss the police and lire contiact 
with Hurricane Present at Hie 
meeling were llardcastle. Hurricane 
recorder Clark Fawcell and tCoun-
cilman Dirk t'arr Represent intf l a 
Verkin were West, l a Verkm City 
Manager Hon Chandler and Coun-
cilman lane Black more I was in at-
tendance at the request ol Mayor 
llardcastle Alter that meeting, I did 
agree with Mayor West to try and 
communicate better. 
"Write what I mean, not what I 
M y . " was how he phrased his re-
aurst I ha.e attempted to do just 
thiit Olten there have tiren limes 
since then when I have licen able lo 
support the mayor bemuse ol toller 
communication with luni I hope In 
the luture to continue to <lo so, hut In 
promising lo communicate with the 
mayor ami make sure I ilou'l mis 
quote him, I In no way |»roiiiiscd to 
only print news which presents him 
In a good liijhl 
Tins is all well and g<fod, IHJI has 
nothing to do with Hie specific 
statements I made in last week* col 
umn As mayor, Teny West is a 
public liguie. m the public eye. and 
Ihcretoi e subject to a certain amount 
of scrutiny. 
In bis rebuttal to the first item In 
my column concerning the location 
of bis business, he says it is his wile's 
business He later lij nis letter refers 
to it as "our business " Regardless, 
It doesn't alter the fact It Is located In 
Springdalc, adding substantially lo 
that community's tax hose. Mayor 
West, in his rebuttal, slates U 
Verkin doesn't have "Its act 
together " 
Rick 
Guidon 
One iMiint I had hoped to make In 
the original column, and which la 
supported by the mayor's rebuttal, la 
that Terry West apparently doesn't 
have I I I I I I h faith in the future ol the 
city lie is supposed to be leading. 
In item two, concerning license 
plates, he refers to his dealer plates 
as a "fringe benefit. In my column, I 
did not accuse him of breaking the 
law, liut rather pointed out he is tak-
ing advantage of a loophole Aa 
previously stated, he Is a public of-
ficial. 
therefore subject I 
for his willingness to utilise loopholes 
for iiersonal advantage 
In Ins icbutfal to item three, con-
cerning bis driver's license. West 
says he doesn't recall ever refusing 
to get a Utah driver's license Yet he 
admits lie doesn't have one, even 
though Utah State l aw (41 2 104) 
specifically states a person who has 
lieen residing here for more than 90 
days must get a Utah drlver'a 
license 
As West so rightly points out, hy 
keeping his Wyoming Driver's 
license, he retains his resident hun-
ting (Nivileges in that state And he 
once a^ain refers to it as a "fringe 
benefit ', one which under Utah law. 
m the public eye, and 
i to a little criticism 
he isn't even entitled to 
In item four, I said Mayor West 
had been opposed to municipal 
power during the election. The 
mayor claims he never took that 
position Several l a Verkin cltlsena 
however, have told me that prior lo 
the election they were under the Im-
pression Weal was oppnsod lo 
municipal power, which u why they 
voted tor him 
Phil Phillips, who serves as chair-
man of the planning and toning com-
mission, said West came lo him alter 
the election and said he was chang-
ing his position on municpal power 
and would support i t I I Weal never 
actually came out before the election 
and said he was opposed to 
municipal power, he certainly did a 
masterful job ol creating an illusion 
he was 
In rebuttal to Item live where Weal 
claims he never said the people 
weren't qualified to make a decision 
on m0ntci|ial power. Anybody who 
attended a l a Verkin city council 
meeting knows that Isn't true. The 
mayor has publicly stated on 
numerous occasions that the people 
didn't have the Information they 
needed to make an Informed decision 
and that the vote ol November was 
therefore invalid In his rebuttal 
Weal aaid if was the reaponaiblllty af 
the elected officials lo spend the peW 
pie's money the wav they want l l 
spent. The people said last 
November they didn't want the issue 
ol municipal I power pursued any fur-
ther. Hy insisting on pursuing 
municipal power. West's actions sup-
port his public statements Indicating 
the people weren't qualified lo decide , 
on public power. 
Item six In my column dealt with 
the break in at Indian Village. 
Nowhere in my column did I accuse 
the mayor ol any lorm ol 
malleasance Use of (he words in-
surance fraud are his. and hia alone. 
To quibble a bit, In his letter the 
mayor list* the current claim from 
that burglary at $4,700 According to 
Leslie Mai at American State In-
surance, holders of the policy at the 
time of the break in, the claim la 
•4.S7S This does not accuee the 
mayor ol anything, but it doea stress 
the apparent flexibility with which 
the mayor tosses around "facta" and 
"figures" 
Item seven, wherein I eeld |he 
mayor tried to push through a beer 
license under the eulee of a condi-
tional use permit, I stand corrected 
In my apparent mlsue of (he word 
"friend r As to the facta aa I 
reported them, I stand by what I 
wrote Alter a motion lor adjourn 
men! had already been passed, the 
mayor tried to reconvene lor a quick 
approval-of the conditional use per-
mit to allow the sale of beer by a 
Micheal Beams Mayor West has In 
formed my editor he had met Mr. 
Beams for the first time that day. Wo 
have no reason to doubt the validity 
of that statement This la all totally 
beside the point The point to. the 
conditional use permit did not have 
the required approval of the planning 
and toning commission, according to 
PAZ Chairman Phil Phillioa 
In my last column, I addressed 
areas of concern I had about the 
Mayor's actions I believe I address-
ed them in a singularly tanopt-
nlonated format. All I have done la 
presented the facta which were 
available to me, and left any conchi 
i to the reader. 
KUDOS and eccefedee to Marshall 
Wright of Cedar City for pointing out 
my ongoing misspelling of the word 
kudo which formerly appeared In 
this column as "cudo." 
I wish I could proffer some clever 
explanation lor the misspelling, such 
as It is a cutesy version, or perhaps 
an old Gothic spelling of the word, 
but the truth of the matter is. I was 
Just plain spelling it wrong 
For picking up on something which 
no one here at the paper did. I hereby 
bestow this week's Armchair Editor 
Award to Mr Wright, along with my 
sincere thanks 
How I came to 'love' LaVerkin's mayor 
t — I I . « * thes cos**** borauao I discuss Mr West and Mr Phillip* for know that mti^i in A M c m t m m v i* IK« . < M M ~J u,.»~*«M c . , . ^ --»»urf ai s sssai I
1 an ™ ^ J ^ V e ? the tnaa facta 
thin* yoy should »•**"•»«? mJ** 
U (hat " " ' ^ ^ ^ S S 
The' I - U ww* i n « t0 M t t t h " 
a^fera a Hit* "*" (Jlt ^ P * 1 , C W , ' dfi f?o Man Uatt or Jofin. right? 
r«n there »r*. (pom U m € t0 t , m t-
a/ferences in tht goapl" accor-
ding to Mayor West andthe Joepel 
a m r * * to U Verkm Planning 
i oeiieve it ia n»gh time both 
lemJemen reaUxe several things. 
- Mr Weat does not have the 
mart* cornered on truth, wtsdcm, 
and rtgniaoueness. Neither does Mr. 
Phillips Neither do l Neither do any 
of my staff members Each of the 
above are Just human beings, fully 
capable of making errors. 
- A newspapers job is not to 
decide what is gospel Our job is to 
report what is going on - what is 
said in public meetings, what 
moyon and cttisane have on their 
mind - as sccuratery and fairly aa 
possible it ta up to each individual to 
then deads which "gasper they 
subscribe ta. 
- News coverage of public 
meetings is always abridged. A radio 
or television report may run a few 
seconds to s minute or two. A 
newspaper account may bo a few in-
ches) up to as many as 30 or 30 inches 
- or § meeting « * 7 rwuit ei en u> 
nisi story and fallow-up pieces about 
issues raised in the mooting, thus 
ilhww$ umo for research end infer* 
views. Citiiens who wish to know 
every word spoken in a two or three 
hour meeting wtU attend the 
meeting. A reporter s job is »to 
highlight the meeting, not report 
every snoots, cough and summer. 
With these things in mind, let's 
la aa at s 
s moment it is not s closely guarded 
secret that tha two disagree fre-
quently That, of course, is their 
nam 
Tht problem 1 have with Use two 
tantieme* ta their rwpeated. seal not 
us subtle, attempts to maiUpuiait>the 
> / 
Brent 
Goodty 
Mr Phillips, < 
has called venous poops* hare at tht 
Sportrvm to reveal soano "hot" Up 
about alleged improprieties by 
Mayor Weat. He has. no doubt, beta 
frequently dumppotmad whet wo 
havt not attempted to "nail" tht 
mayor baaed at issssshstintislsd 
statements or items takea tat of 
A good example would be a remark 
Mr. Weat made at a city council 
meeting several weeks sgo. 1 don t 
remember the exact statement now, 
but to our reporter it seemed obvious 
Mr West made the statement m p t 
and people at tha meeting laughed 
along with tha mayor. But when tha 
remark was not quoted in our story, 
Mr Phillips accused us of protecting 
and covering up for the mayor. 
Give mo a break, Mr. Phillips If 
wo quoted every funny remark made 
in )eat by St. Georgt Mayor Karl 
Brooks, wo wouldn't havt room for 
tht news, and these who don't know 
Mr. Brooks would think St. George 
had a stand-up comic for a mayor, 
rather than a wtae and witty, kind 
human being. 
Then thert it Mr. West Unlike 
mort experienced poliucians. who 
 t t criticism and ontroversy 
come with the territory, apparently 
he has chosen to believe this 
newspaper has joined m some 
diabolical conspiracy against him 
Gee. I wtah I had time to master* 
mtnd a plot against you. Mr West. I 
would use the time, if I had it. to play 
golf or be with my family rather than 
to conspire - but I do wish 1 had tht 
time. 
You should know, Mr West, your 
ilkgauona that Mr. PtuUipa cleverly 
manjupiatea news coveraajs art 
.without merit It isn't that he haaaVt 
tried. He, like you. Mr Weat, bos 
mod to convusee us that his gtsptJ is 
tht true goapti. But in hie case, ana) 
yours, snd everyone tlsea, wo must 
continue to give coverage of 
newsworthy events baaed on our bast 
professional judgment - whether 
you hke it or not. 
1 will choose to believe, at this 
point, that your motives are the 
purest, Mr. West, snd that Mr. 
Phillips also has nothing but wanting 
the bast for La Vert in behind his ac-
tions But since each of you seem to 
think we are in league with tht other 
- and the other ta the dtviT - how 
can both of you be correct? 
Mr. Phillips, we have attempted to 
verify, each of your "hot' tips about 
Mr. West, but many turn out to*bt 
mountaina made from molehills, so 
we tanore them and you think we 
coddle your political enemy. 
Mr. Weat. we nave come to expect 
your regular visits and letter* ta tail 
us how wo art out to got you.! htpt 
this doesn't coma as too otg a blow, 
but we seldom even think about ytu 
between visits. 
I wonder why the same reporters 
can cover tht samt kinds of 
meetings - including some with con-
troversy as great as the LaVerkin 
police issue - and it does not result 
is Use mayors of Humcsne. Santa 
Clara, Ivma. Meaquite. St. George or 
Cedar City, running m to charge us 
with bus. snd personal vendeitj* 
Maybe they are aware ihry »m 
nr^or bo unanimously lewd and 
K suved by all iMir conaiuuenuv sybe they recognise senna prin-
cipals, business managers, retired 
executives from Large eoporanon*. 
and even council members nave * 
right to tspresa their opinions and 
their opinions may oe 'just as 
newsworthy as those of a mayor 
As for the implication in your let 
ter. Mr West, we covered up Mr 
Phillips actions in Wednesday 
mghta council meeting, may 1 aaa 
why we would want to1 There is a 
simpler explanation, sir Since La 
Verkin doosn t send us copies of their 
meeting agendas like most local 
communities do. and since they nor 
mally moot just twice a month, our 
reporter — having attended a 
matting tht previous week - forgot 
that meeting had been postponed a 
weak snd thus missed lacs week s 
La Vert is City Council meeting. 
Thursday morning a reporter called 
several principal ngures from the 
meeting and wrote a story About the 
same time vou came in to our offices. 
Mr. Weat. You did indeed leave your 
information about Mr. Phillips 
"making a spectacle of Issnseif 
Unfortunately, I didn t get a chance 
to see it until after Thursdays 
deadline, but a reporter was assign-
ed to follow through on Use metier 
Your letter — which wea saparenUy 
designed to embarrass Mr PhiUipa 
and, ones again, use our newsprint to 
publish accusations about how unfair 
we art to you - may now suffice un-
til the ultimate resolution of the mat-
ter with Mr Phillips and Use pi*nn-
mg commission. 
I would have much preferred 
writing about some mort peaasant 
' Mss this week, and 1 normally 
it respond to letters in PuMic 
Forum, but Mr West and Mr 
PhiUipa have worn my patience very 
thin.
 0 
Disagree with our choice of comic 
strips, editorial views, or selection of 
columnists, if you wish, and you 11 
get no armament from me Tell me 
we should here covered your birth-
day party, instead of a major com-
munity event, snd III defend your 
nsht to chat opinion. But ! cannot 
allow such specious charges u Mr 
West makes to go unanswered When 
a pubuc figure like Mr West accuses 
us of bias, or of being manipulated oy 
another pubbc figure, he is playing 
with tht liveuhooos of dotena of 
newspaper employees and. more »nv. 
portanJy, toying with a vital compo-
nent of our free society A newspaper 
without credibility J m big trouble 
Notict, I did not say a perfect 
newspaper. Wo make mistakes, but 
they art hstssst mistakes. 
Of cstsfta. if Mr. West could con-
vines readers ta LaVenua the 
newspaper ta biased against him 
then anything which appeared in the 
paper about rum would be suspect m 
thttr eyas I wonder if that ta what he 
si hoping ta achieve if politicians 
art allowed ta operate in a news 
vscuum. tht society is in big trouble 
Still, ! can t, far the life of me. 
figure out what Mr West ihinka we. 
would havt ta gain by consptnng 
against tht m^ot of the beautiful Ut-
ile) csjMMftMt» where he lives. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IK AND FCP THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY R. WEST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 1 
THOMPSON NEWSPAPERS, dba 
THE DAILY SPECTRUM, 
DON E. HOGUN, BRENT C-OODEY and i 
RICK GULDAN, 
1 MEMORANDUM 
OPINION 
Civil No. 89-2*83 
Defendants. 
The above entitled natter came before the Court for Oral 
Argument on November 22, 1989 on the Motion of the Defendants to 
Dismiss. The Plaintiff was represented by himself and the 
Defendants, except for Defendant Rick Guldan, were represented by 
Randy L. Dryer. Defendant Guldan was not present nor represented 
and did not participate herein. For purposes of this motion the 
Defendant's Statement of Facts was accepted as true by the parties. 
The Plaintiff brought an action against the Defendants 
for libel resulting from three different newspaper articles which 
were published on the editorial page of the Defendant Newspaper. 
One of the editorials was authored by Defendant Brent Goocey and 
the other two by Defendant Rick Guldan. At the time of the 
publication of these articles, the Plaintiff was the elected mayor 
of LaVerkin. During the campaign for city officials in 1987 the 
issue of whether or not LaVerkin should convert to a municipal 
power system was hotly contested in that community. There was 
also a substantial controversy about whether or not the City of 
LaVerkin should renew its contract with the City of Hurricane for 
police services or pursue some other course of action. The 
articles which the Plaintiff claims are defamatory are attached to 
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion 
To Dismiss submitted by the Defendants and are incorporated in 
this Memorandum Opinion by this reference. The first of the 
articles was written on June 27th, 1988, by Defendant Rick 
Guldan. Thereafter, on July 1st, 1988, the Plaintiff submitted a 
letter to the editor responding to what he alleged were defamatory 
comments in the June 27th, 1988 column. The letter submitted by 
the Plaintiff was published in the Letters To The Editor section 
of the Spectrum on July 2nd, 1988. That letter is likewise 
attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by 
the Defendants and incorporated herein by this reference. 
4? 
On July 2nd, 1988, Defendant Guldan responded to the 
Plaintiff's letter in the same issue and adjacent to the 
Plaintiff's letter to the editor. 
On November 30th, 1988, Brent Goodey authored a column 
which was published in the Spectrum. The Plaintiff asserts that 
certain statements made in the June 27th, July 2nd and November 
30th articles are defamatory. 
The Defendants assert in their Kotion To Dismiss that 
the Plaintiff's entire Complaint should be dismissed for three 
reasons : 
1. That the statements of which the Plaintiff 
complains are not defamatory as a matter 
of law. 
2. That the statements of which the Plaintiff 
complains are not actionable as a matter 
of law because they are mere expressions of 
opinion. 
3. That the Plaintiff has failed to plead that 
he suffered special damages as required 
under Utah law. 
Prior to commencement of oral argument it was brought to 
the Court's attention that the Plaintiff, without obtaining leave 
of the Court, had filed with the Clerk an Amended Complaint which 
did in fact allege certain special damages resulting from the 
defamation. Counsel for both sides stipulated in open Court that 
the Amended Complaint should be filed and that the Motion ^c 
Dismiss should be applied to the Amended Complaint. 
The filing of the Amended Complaint disposes of the 
third basis upon which the Defendants move to dismiss since it 
does contain allegations of special damages. 
The first basis for the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss i 
their claim that the statements of which the Plaintiff complains 
are not defamatory. Section 45-2-2 U.C.A. defines libel as 
follows: 
(1). "Libel" means a malicious defamation, 
expressed either by printing or by signs 
or pictures or the like, tending to blacken 
the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach 
the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, 
or publish the natural defects of one who 
is alive, and thereby to expose him to 
public hatred, contempt or ridicule." 
The Court must make an initial determination as to 
whether or not the alleged defamatory statements could possibly 
meet that criteria in the minds of any reasonable jury. In the 
case of Cox vs. Hatch, 761 P. 2nd 556, the Utah Supreme Court 
said, as follows: 
"We acknowledge, however, a First Amendment 
interest in disposing of libel cases on 
motion and at an early stage when it 
appears that a reasonable jury could not 
find for the Plaintiff. 
If no defamatory meaning can reasonably be 
inferred by reasonable persons from the 
communication, the action must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
Only if a Court first determines that 
a publication miaht be considered 
defamatory by a reasonable person is 
there a fact issue for the trier of fact." 
After reviewing the various statements of which the 
Plaintiff complains the Court finds that only those statements 
made in the column authored by Defendant Brent Coodey should be 
dismissed. Mr. Coodey accused the Plaintiff of manipulating the 
press. This Court finds that the charge of manipulation of the 
press could not possibly give rise to a defamatory meaning in the 
minds of reasonable jurors within the meaning of the definition 
quoted above. Therefore, the cause of action against Defendant 
Coodey is dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
With regard to the remaining causes of action which are 
attributed to reporter Rick Culdan, the Court finds that a 
reasonable person might determine that the offensive language was 
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libelous or at least that one interpretation of the offensive 
language would constitute libel. It therefore becomes a matter 
for a jury to determine whether or not the recipient of the 
language would have assigned the libelous meaning to it. 
The second basis for the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss 
is that the statements of which the Plaintiff complains were mere 
expressions of opinion and even if derogatory are not actionable. 
The Defendants argue that the comments of Defendant Guldan as 
published in the Spectrum were simply opinions and therefore 
entitled to some absolute privilege. In support of that 
proposition the Defendants cite, among other cases, the case of 
Ogden °us Lines vs. KSL Incorporated, 551 P. 2nd 222, a 1976 Utah 
Supreme Court decision. Careful analysis of that case reveals 
that Defendants misunderstand its holding. 
The general proposition of fair comment on an issue of 
public concern is treated under the heading of Libel and Slander, 
50 Am Jur 2nd, Section 290. There the rule is stated as follows: 
,fTo constitute fair comment, the pulication must 
(1) relate to a matter of public interest; 
(2) relate not to a person, but to his 
acts, and, except as warranted by 
the facts, must not impute dishonorable 
motives to one whose work or conduct is 
criticized; 
(3) Generally rust be based on facts 
truly stated; and 
(4) rrust be an honest and fair expression 
on the facts." 
In the Odgen Bus Lines case, the Supreme Court stated 
these general propositions as follows: 
"it is firirly established that matters 
of public interest and concern are 
ligitimate subjects of fair comment 
and criticism, not only in newspapers, 
and in radio and television broadcasts, 
but by members of the public 
generally, and such comments and 
criticisms are not actionable, 
however severe in their terms, 
unless they are made maliciously..." 
and a little further on, the Court cites the remainder of the Rule" 
as follows: 
"...The right of comment is not restricted 
to a restatement of the naked facts. As a 
general rule it may include the right to 
draw inferences or express opinions from 
facts established. The soundness of the 
inferences or opinions is immaterial 
whether they are right or wrong, provided 
they are made in good faith and based 
upon the truth...ff 
The Court then went on to hold in that case, as follows: 
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"we do not find any of the above elements 
of malice present in this case from the 
evidence before the Court. In order to 
prevail, the Plaintiff had the burden of 
showing malice on the Defendant's part 
in the broadcast of the alleged defamatory 
statements. 
Since we do not find that the Defendant 
made any false statements in said 
editorial, it is deemed unnecessary 
to consider the Plaintiff's allegation 
that Defendant did not exercise due 
care to prevent the broadcast of the 
editorial. This would be immaterial 
in the absence of any false assertions." 
Both sides in this case agree that for purposes of this 
Motion To Dismiss at this early stage of the proceedings, this 
Court must assume that the statements of which the Plaintiff 
complains were made falsely and maliciously. This Court is unable 
to find any authority for the proposition that opinions of all 
types are subject to any absolute privilege. In fact, the 
authority seems to be to the contrary. The law of the State of 
Utah appears to be that opinions have a conditional or qualified 
privilege if they are based on true facts and are not rendered 
with malicious intent. Of course, in the case presently before 
the Court, it is uncontested that the Plaintiff was a public 
official at the time of the alleged defamation and therefore, he 
is required to demonstrate actual malice in the publication of 
these statements before he can prevail. Plaintiff is entitled, 
however, to attempt that proof before a trier of fact and 
Defendant is not entitled to a dismissal of the action at this 
stage. 
Therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED 
except as to the cause of action relating to the statements made 
by Defendant Brent Goodey. That cause of action is dismissed as 
stated above and Mr. Goodey is discharged as a Defendant in this 
action. 
DATED this 3&~ day of ^^o^A^^tyQ^^ , 1989. * 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUEM £fc 5 ^ 
IN AND FCR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE" CF UTAH-
TERRY R. WEST, 
vs • 
Plaintiff, 
THOMSON NEWSPAPERS, dba THE 
DAILY SPECTRUM, and DON E. 
HOGUN, BRENT GOODEY and 
PICK GULDAN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
OPINION 
Civil No, 890502683 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on 
June 7, 1990 on defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
plaintiff represented himself and the defendants Thomson 
Newspapers, Don E. Hogun and Brent Goodey were represented by 
Randy L. Dryer. The parties submitted lengthy memoranda and the 
Court also heard their oral arguments. The Court then took the 
matter under submission. 
The Court having now reviewed the authorities cited by 
the parties as well as other authorities, now enters the follov/ing 
Memorandum Opinion. 
CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFF 
In his Amended Complaint filed November 13, 1989, 
plaintiff alleges that he was defamed by the defendants in 
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newspaper articles published on June 27, 1933 (the June article) 
and again on July 2, 1938 (the July article). The June article is 
the basis of two specific areas of complaint. Plaintiff first 
alleges he was defamed by statements indicating that he had 
advocated a popular opinion about a hotly contested municipal 
issue (municipal power) prior to his election to the office of 
Mayor of the Town of LaVerkin but that immediately following his 
election he had abandoned his pre-election position on the issue 
and instead advocated the opposite position, a position much less 
popular with the voters in the community. 
Plaintiff also contends that the June article defamed 
him by statements that he had trouble keeping his facts straight. 
In support of that allegation the article cites the example that 
after plaintiff's business was burglarized there was at first no 
loss reported, then suddenly a loss of nearly $7,000.00 was 
reported to the Sheriff and thereafter an insurance claim of more 
than $13,000.00 was filed by the plaintiff. 
With regard to the July article, plaintiff claims he was 
defamed by publication of a separate article by the same reporter 
which in essence repeated the same defamatory allegations as the 
June article. The July article was written and published as a 
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rebuttal to a letter to the editor which the plaintiff wrote and 
submitted tc the defendant newspaper and which the defendants 
published in the sa.T.e issue as the July article. 
COMMON CRCUITD 
The parties have agreed and the Court has ruled that 
plaintiff was the Mayor of LaVerkin at all times relevant to this 
case and was a public official within the meaning of New York 
Times vs. Sullivanf 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Therefore, in addition 
to proving that the statements in the defendant newspaper were 
defamatory and false, plaintiff must prove that the statements 
were published by each defendant with "actual malice", i.e.: that 
the defendants had knowledge that the statements were false, or 
published the statements with reckless disregard of the truth'cr 
falsity thereof. The parties likewise agree that proof of actual 
malice must be by clear and convincing evidence. 
Beyond that there is little agreement between the 
parties on the law or its application in this case. It appears, 
however, that the only material factual disputes raised by the 
parties revolve around the issues of what evidence and inferences 
are to be considered as proof of actual malice and whether the 
statements made were fact or opinion. These disputes raise issues 
of law which the Court can properly decide in ruling on a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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DEFAMATORY FACT VS. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED OPINION 
Defendants contend that the statements in the two 
articles relating to the plaintiff's change of position on the 
municipal power issue are not actionable. They first assert that 
those statements are not defamatory as they do not expose the 
plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. In essence, the 
defendants argue that politicians frequently change their 
positions on issues and that accusing a public official of such a 
change, even if false, does not injure the reputation of the 
public official. 
eOf course, to determine whether or not the statement is 
defamatory one must consider the statement and its meaning in the 
context in which the statement was mace and not in a vacuum. This 
allegation of a change in position was made following a hotly 
contested election in a small community where candidates lost or 
won depending upon their announced position regarding municipal 
power. The voters had, prior to the election, expressed their 
opposition to the acquisition of a power distribution system by 
the City of LaVerkin. The voters were therfore likely to elect 
those whose shared the opposition espoused by the majority. Under 
those circumstances, it is clear that a candidate who would 
f 
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espouse opposition to municipal power to get elected and then 
immediately pursue a pro-municipal power agenda as Mayor of the 
City would be viewed as a liar and the worst kind of political 
cheat. To suggest that those who trusted such a man and voted for 
him because of his announced intentions would not, following his 
change of heart, have at least contempt for him borders on the 
ridiculous. The statements of the defendants, if made as 
assertions of fact, falsely and with actual malice, would clearly 
be defamatory as they would hold the plaintiff up to contempt, 
hatred, and ridicule in his community. 
The issue then becomes whether or not those statements 
are statements of fact or constitutionally protected expressions 
of opinion. The defendants contend for the latter position and 
the plaintiff for the former. The line between what is fact and 
what is opinion is often difficult to draw. In the case of Oilman 
vs. Evans, 750 Fed 2nd 970 (1984), the Court gave an excellant 
discussion of the delicate balancing process which Courts of law 
must undertake in this area and suggested an approach which this 
Court has applied to the facts of this case. It is clear from 
that opinion and others [see also Sinaldi vs. Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, Inc. 366 NE 2nd 1299 (1977); Ogden Bus Lines vs. KSL, 
Inc., 551 P 2nd 222 (Utah, 1976)] that determining what 
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constitutes protected opinions under the First Amendment and 
actionable statements of fact is a matter of law and a proper 
focus for a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In attempting to make the required determination, this 
Court has referred to the exact language of the statements of 
which the plaintiff complains. For purposes of discussion the 
text of those statements should be set forth. In the June 
article, Mr. Guldan wrote: 
"Terry West says the city council should listen 
to the people. The people spoke last November 
in a general election on the issue of municipal 
power. The people said they didn't want it, and 
Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed 
to it. However the first thing West did as 
Mayor was ignore the wishes of the people 
(claiming they weren't qualified to make that 
decision) and reactivate the municipal power 
issue. Apparently West believes you should 
only listen to the people when they agree 
with you. Now that the police issue has been 
dealt with, you can be sure municipal power 
will rear its ugly head once again." 
Plaintiff apparently takes issue, primarily, with the 
statement "and Terry West, when running for mayor was opposed to 
it." (municipal power). For purposes of the following analysis, 
this Court assumes that this statement was false and was made with 
actual malice. The inquiry then becomes whether or not these 
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comments are a statement of fact or a statement of the reporter's 
constitutionally protected opinion. For the reasons set forth 
hereinafter it is the finding of this Court that these statements 
are part of a constitutionally protected statement of the 
reporter's opinion. 
The writings of the United States Supreme Court as well 
as several other State Courts and lower Federal Courts clearly 
indicate that great latitude is accorded to expressions of opinion 
in the context of public debate over issues of general concern. 
The First Amendment protects statements of pure opinion, even if 
they are false and defamatory. (See Rinaldi vs. Holtf Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., ibid., and Oilman vs. Fvans, ibid.) In the 
statement at hand the reporter was expressing his own opinion of 
the pre-election opinion of the mayor. He did not suggest that he 
had any unrevealed facts to support his statement and in fact he 
gave no supporting facts at all in the June article. The exact 
meaning of his statement is subject to some interpretation as 
being opposed to municipal power does not clearly define the 
mayor's feelings or statements on the subject nor does it charge 
the mayor with any statement or act. It appears that the 
statement was intended as an interpretation by the reporter of the 
pre-election position of the mayor. 
7 
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To find that such a statement was a statement of fact 
such as would subject the reporter to an action for defamation and 
a claim for damages would clearly chill legitimate public debate 
over an issue cf concern to the community. It is clear that the 
positions and attitudes of public officials on matters affecting 
those whom they govern are always subject to analysis by the press 
and by the electorate. One who observes the activities of an 
elected official and draws conclusions from that observation, then 
forms opinions from those conclusions and states them publicly 
should not be placed in jeopardy of legal action as it is 
important that the press and the electorate have the freedom tc 
express their ideas and to exchange information. In an arena such 
as this no one but the mayor would know all of the facts necessary 
tc correctly and precisely define his position on municipal power 
and therefore anyone venturing an opinion may misstate it. But 
that danger should not prevent the public from debating the issue 
as the importance of public debate on an issue of this nature 
clearly outweighs the danger to the mayor of a misstatement of his 
position. 
In the July article Mr. Guldan, the reporter, wrote: 
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"In item four, I said Mayor West had been 
opposed to municipal power during the election. 
The Mayor claims he never took that position. 
Several LaVerkin citizens however, have tcld 
me that prior to the election they were under 
the impression West was opposed to municipal 
power, which is why they voted for him. 
Phil Phillips, who serves as chairman of 
the planning and zoning commission, said West 
came to him after the election and said he was 
changing his position on municipal power and 
would support it. If West never actually came 
out before the election and said he was opposed 
to municipal power, he certainly did a 
masterful job of creating an illusion he was." 
The Court has analyzed the July article and the 
statement above quoted using the Oilman vs. Evans standards and 
now finds for those reasons stated above and those stated 
hereafter that these statements of the defendants are also 
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion. The New York 
Court of Appeals has been widely quoted for its opinion of Rinaldi 
vs. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., ibid. In that case the Court 
held that even erroneous opinions are constitutionally protected 
so that debate on public issues may remain robust and unfettered, 
and concerned individuals may have necessary freedom to speak 
their conscience. The Court went on to hold that where one 
expresses an opinion and then sets forth the basis for that 
opinion, no action for defamation can be maintained. 
f 
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In the July article Mr. Guldan reiterates, in response 
to Mr. rest's letter of the prior day discuting the June 
statements, his opinion regarding the payor's change of position 
on the municipal power issue. He then cites "Several LaVerkin 
citizens. . ." who he claims have provided him with the 
information upon which his opinion is based. He gees on to quote 
the name of one such person, Mr. Phil Phillips, who has in fact in 
this case submitted an affidavit in which he admits providing the 
information which Mr. Culdan quotes in his July article. Under 
the rationale of the Rinaldi decision it appears that Mr. Guldan's 
statements in the July article are statements of pure opinion, the 
reasons" for which have been set forth, and therefore are not 
actionable. 
Plaintiff attempts to counter this position by alleging 
that although Mr. Phillips has corroborated Mr. Guldan's 
statements in the July article that not all of the sources (the 
LaVerkin citizens) which Mr. Guldan later identified at his 
deposition as having given him information have given that 
corroboration. The fact that some of the persons who Mr. Guldan 
may have talked to prior to the article have not chosen to 
corroborate his statement does not create a cause of action where 
one would not previously have existed. It is clear that Mr. 
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Guldan was entitled to state his opinion on this matter of public 
concern without any sources or to quote only Mr. Phillips if he 
chose to use a source. The fact that he also claimed to have 
received information from other citizens does not render his 
statement of opinion an actionable one. 
This Court therefore grants to the defendants and 
against the plaintiff that portion of the Summary Judgment 
relating to the cause of action in each of the two articles 
wherein Plaintiff is alleged to have changed his position 
regarding the issue of municipal power. This Court finds that 
those statements are constitutionally protected expressions of 
opinion and not actionable statements of fact. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Defendants next argue that Summary Judgment should be 
granted to them as to all statements in plaintiff's 1st and 2nd 
Causes of Action because plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, 
demonstrate that the statements were made with actual malice. 
Before this Court can determine that issue it must first decide 
the proper approach to a Motion for Summary Judgment in a 
defamation case involving a public figure and the proper standard 
of review to be applied. 
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Rule 55 (c) O.R.C.P. states the general rule regarding 
Summary Judgments in this state. It provides: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." 
The plaintiff takes the position that this is the 
standard which this Court should employ in deciding the issues in 
this case. The plaintiff would have the Court simply look at the 
factual allegations made by the parties and determine whether or 
not there are any material facts in dispute. The defendants 
assert, however, that a different and higher standard applies in 
this type of case. They cite for authority the U. S. Supreme 
Court decision in Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,, 477 U.S. 242 
(1986). The plaintiff relies on Tavoularease vs. Piro, 759 F. 2nd 
90 (1985). The Court has reviewed both of these cases and 
although there may be some superficial distinctions as to the 
standard of review involved, this Court finds that the approach 
that the two Courts took was generally similar and since the 
Anderson decision was decided after the Tavoularease and by a 
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higher Court, any differences in the statements of the law 
involved in those cases must be resolved in favor of the Anderson 
case. 
Anderson was a Summary Judgment case. The Court set 
forth a test for Summary Judgment in a public figure defamation 
case therein that is slightly different than the general standard 
under 56(c) U.P.C.P. although the Court phrased its decision as an 
attempt to implement the provisions of that statute. The Anderson 
Court held that in deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment in a 
case such as this the trial court cannot weigh the evidence where 
conflicts exist in the evidence. Pather, the Court must take all 
of the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom which are 
marshalled by the opponent to the Motion (the plaintiff) in its 
most favorable light to the opponent to the Motion, and then 
decide whether the evidence so marshalled creates a triable issue 
for the jury, i.e.: whether there is enough evidence of actual 
malice that a reasonable jury could properly find against the 
moving party at trial if they believed everything that the 
plaintiff presented. The Anderson Court also held that in making 
this determination the court must take into consideration the fact 
that the plaintiff will be held to demonstrate actual malice to 
the jury by clear and convincing evidence. 
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ACTUAL MALICE DY DEFENDANTS 
This Court has attempted to apply this test to the case 
at hand by analyzing the evidence as to each defendant on each 
allegedly defamatory statement. In his Statement of Material 
Facts submitted with his Memorandum of Points & Authorities in 
this matter the plaintiff has set forth numerous facts and 
arguments which he alleges create a genuine issue of fact on the 
issue of actual malice as to each defendant and each statement. 
It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff does not contend 
that there is any evidence of actual malice as to the defendant . 
Hogun relating to the publication of the June article. Therefore, 
application of the actual malice standard for Summary Judgment 
will not be discussed as it relates to that article and that 
defendant and Summary Judgment is granted to the Defendant Hogun 
with regard to the June article. 
Having reviewed all of the evidence identified by the 
parties and accepting all of the plaintiff's facts as true, the 
Court finds that no reasonable jury could find by clear and 
convincing evidence that either Mr. Hogun or Mr. Goodey published 
either the June or July articles knowing they were false or with 
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity thereof. 
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With regard to the July article the plaintiff alleges 
three points on which he relies in support of his claim that Mr. 
Hogun acted with actual malice at the time of the publication of 
that article. First, he alleges that following the June article, 
he contacted Mr. Hogun personally and pointed out the inaccuracies 
in the June article. Second, that he gave Mr. Hogun some "letters 
to citizens" which he alleges somehow demonstrated that he had 
supported municipal power prior to the election. Third, he 
alleges that even with the information he supplied, Hogun did no 
further investigation and allowed the second article to be 
published. 
Defendant Hogun is the publisher of The Daily Spectrum. 
It is undisputed that he did not review either article personally 
but relied on 3rent Goodey, the managing editor of the paper, to 
do that. After receiving the plaintiffs visit, comments, and the 
letters to citizens as well as the plaintiff's letter to the 
editor on July 1st, Defendant Hogun contacted legal counsel and 
spoke with him regarding the newspaper's responsibility. 
Thereafter he caused a retraction to be published regarding the 
insurance claim statements in the June article. He then caused 
Mr. West's letter to the editor to be published so that Mr. West's 
statement of the issues would come before the readership of the 
paper, Mr. Hogun admits that he did no further investigation as 
to the truthfulness of the June article's allegations. 
Even if this course of conduct is correctly stated, it 
does not evidence reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of 
the June or July statements. A publisher has the right to rely on 
a reporter's quotations of his sources without contacting the 
sources himself or doing an independant investigation of the 
truthfulness of the quotes. [See St. Amant vs. Thompson, 390 U.S. 
727 (1958); New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 283 (1964); 
and Karaduman vs. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E. 2d 557 (1980)]. Nor 
must a publisher take as gospel the statements of a subject of an 
article (the mayor). Rather, the publisher must himself entertain 
serious doubts as to the truth of the article before he is 
publishing with actual malice (St. Amant vs. Thompson, ibid. ) 
Plaintiff has presented no evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
could rely to find by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hogun 
published with actual malice. This Court has reviewed the 
"letters to citizens" which plaintiff demonstrate his pre-election 
position. These letters appear ambiguous and unenlightening to 
this Court. At best they show that some candidates took clear 
positions on the municipal power issue at the mayor's request but 
the letters do not clearly state Mr. West's position on that 
issue. It is clear as a matter of law that the letters themselves 
do net place Mr. Hogun on notice that the statements in the June 
article were false. Nor do Mr. West's denials of the statement as 
to his pre-election position and Mr. Hogun had no duty to 
investigate the matter further and could rely on the statements of 
his reporter. 
Accordingly, Summary Judgment is granted against the 
plaintiff and in favor of Defendant Hogun on all issues and 
Defendant Hogun is ordered dismissed as a party in this case. 
The plaintiff claims as a basis for his allegation of 
actual malice against Brent Goodey, editor of the The Daily 
Spectrum, that Mr. Goodey should have independently investigated 
the statements made by Mr. Guldan in his column prior to 
publishing those statements. For the reasons set forth above, 
this Court rejects that position and finds that Mr. Goodey had no 
such obligation of independent investigation. The failure to 
conduct such an investigation does not indicate the presence of 
actual malice, let alone prove it by clear and convincing 
evidence* 
With regard to the July article the plaintiff basically 
alleges that Mr. Goodey, having the information available to him 
that the plaintiff had delivered to Mr. Hogun, then had the 
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obligation to investigate further before publishing or allowing 
the publication of the July article. Plaintiff arrears to assert 
that failure to follow up and investigate in light of the new 
information which he had provided to the newspaper constituted 
evidence of reckless disregard of truth or falsity. 
For the reasons cited above with regard to the defendan 
Hogun, these claims are found to be without rrerit. In St. Arrant 
vs. Thompson, ibid./ the sane claim was made in opposition to a 
notion for Summary Judgment. The U. S. Supreme Court stated, in 
reversing the Louisiana Supreme Court: 
"St. Amant had no personal knowledge of 
Thompson's activities; he relied solely on 
Albin's affidavit although the record was 
silent as to Albinfs reputation for veracity; 
he failed to verify the information with those 
in the union office who might have known the 
facts; he gave no consideration to whether or 
not the statements defamed Thompson and went 
ahead heedless of the consequences; and he 
mistakenly believed he had no responsibility 
for the broadcast because he was merely 
quoting Albin's words. 
These considerations fall short of 
proving St. Amant's reckless disregard for 
the accuracy of his statements about 
Thompson." p. 730. 
Still later in the same opinion at pages 732 & 733, we find: 
"Nothing referred to by the Louisiana 
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courts indicates an awareness by St. 
Amant of the probable falsity of Albin's 
statement about Thompson. Failure to 
investigate does not in itself establish 
bad faith." 
and elsewhere in the same opinion after citing prior U. S. 
Supreme Court opinions on the subject we find: 
"These cases are clear that reckless 
conduct is not measured by whether a 
reasonably prudent man would have 
published, or would have investigated 
before publishing. There must be 
sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publications." p. 731. 
Plaintiff has failed to marshall sufficient evidence to 
indicate that Mr. Goodey in fact published either article knowing 
that the contents were false or in reckless disregard of the truth 
or falsity of the contents. Therefore, Summary Judgment is 
granted to the defendant Goodey and against the Plaintiff as to 
all causes of action and the defendant Goodey is dismissed as a 
party to this action. 
Plaintiff next asserts that the reporter, Mr. Culdan, 
published the statements in the June article and the statements in 
the July article with actual malice. This Court has previously 
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ruled in this opinion that the statements of defendant Guldan 
regarding the plaintiff's position on municipal power were 
constitutionally protected statements of opinion and therefore not 
actionable* If such had not been the case this Court would have 
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the defendant Guldan 
on those statements since it appears that there are significant 
conflicts in the evidence as to whether the statements were 
published with actual malice, sufficient to create an issue for 
the jury* 
With regard to the statements of the defendant Guldan in 
the June article having to do with the insurance claim, this Court 
finds that such statements are not expressions of opinion but are 
in fact expressions of fact and could be construed to constitute 
allegations of criminal or civil wrongdoing and dishonesty. The 
plaintiff has marshalled sufficient evidence to preclude Summary 
Judgment as to those accusations in that he has demonstrated that 
there is a significant question for the jury as to the defendant 
Guldan's sources for that information and whether or not Mr. 
Guldan knew that the statement was false. Given those conflicts, 
this Court finds that a reasonable jury could find by clear and 
convincing evidence that the statement regarding the insurance 
claim in the June article was false and that the reporter knew 
T,* 
that it v/as false or that he was reckless as to the accuracy of 
that statement. Summary Judgment as to that statement is denied. 
Regarding the statement of Defendant Guldan on the 
subject of the insurance claim in the July article, this Court has 
reviewed that article in its entirety and finds that the 
statements contained in that article relating to the insurance 
claim are not defamatory. Even if those statements are false they 
would not be such as to hold the defendant up to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule. On that basis the Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to that article is granted. 
RETPACTICN AND ACTUAL DAMAGES 
The parties have raised an additional issue relating to 
the effect and meaning of 45-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as Amended, as 
applied in this case. Defendant claims that since they published 
a prompt retraction of the insurance claim statements in the June 
article that the plaintiff is precluded from recovering on his 1st 
Cause of Action with regard to that portion of the article because 
he cannot as a matter of law demonstrate that he has suffered any 
actual damage as required under Utah's Retraction Statute. It 
would appear that the defendants would have this Court define 
"actual damages" to mean special damages or demonstrable 
out-of-pocket costs and losses as opposed to general compensatory 
damages. 
2/ 
In support of their positions the parties have cited no 
cases from the State of Utah defining the term "actual damages'1 as 
it appears from the statute. An analysis of other authorities, 
however, sheds light on the question. 
In the Revised Fourth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary, 
p. 467, actual damages is defined as follows: 
"Real, substantial and just damages, or the 
amount awarded to a complainant in compensation 
for his actual and real loss or injury, as 
opposed on the one hand to "nominal" damages, 
and on the other to "exemplary" or 
"punitive" damages." 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 25, Damages, Section 2, p. 
616 defines actual damaaes as follows: 
"Actual damages covers all loss 
recoverable as a matter of right, and 
has been said to include all damages 
except exemplary or punitive damages." 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 53, Libel and Slander, 
Section 189, p. 279, states: 
"A successful plaintiff in an action 
for libel or slander is entitled to recover 
such actual or compensatory damages as are 
2-2-
the natural and direct or proximate result 
of the publication but not speculative or 
remote damaces." 
And at section 195(b), p. 285 of the same C.J.S. volume 
and article we find: 
"Defendant may show in mitigation 
of damages that he has published or 
made a retraction of, or apology for, 
the defamatory words which are the 
subject of the action, even, it has been 
held, though the retraction was not 
published until after the action was 
commenced." 
Finally, in Gertz vs. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) p. 349, 
a U. S. Supreme Court decision, we find the following language: 
"The common law of defamation is an 
oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery 
of purportedly compensatory damages without 
evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions 
for libel, the existence of injury is 
presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as 
compensation for supposed damages to 
reputation without any proof that such 
harm actually occurred." 
Later in the same opinion, on page 350, we find; 
23 372-
"We need not define "actual injury", as 
trial courts have wide experience in framing 
appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. 
Suffice it to say that actual injury is 
not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, 
the more customary types of actual harm 
inflicted by defamation falsehood include 
impairment of reputation and standing in 
the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, 
juries must be limited by appropriate 
instructions, and all awards must be supported 
by competent evidence concerning the injury, 
although there need be no evidence which 
assigns an actual dollar value to the injury." 
This Court therefore holds that if defendants can meet 
the test established by 45-2-1 U.C.A.* 1953 as Amended, with regar 
to the adequacy and sufficiency of their printed retraction, they 
can limit any recovery to the plaintiff by deleting therefrom any 
award for punitive or exemplary damages. In addition, defendants 
can introduce evidence of a printed retraction in mitigation of 
any claim for actual or compensatory damages by the plaintiff. 
Hov/ever, the plaintiff is not limited in his claim for damages to 
his out-of-pocket losses or his special damages but rather is 
entitled to compensatory damages in accordance with the 
authorities set forth hereinabove if he is able to establish the 
elements of liability. 
2¥ 
In Summary then, the Motion for Summary Judgment of the 
defendants is GPANTED with regard to the entire July article for 
the reasons set forth hereinabove. In addition, the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of the defendants is GRANTED as to defendants 
Hogun and Goodey as to the June Article. There remains for trial 
only the clains against the defendant Newspaper and the reporter, 
Mr. Guldan, with regard to the statements in the June article 
relating to the filing of the insurance claim. 
DATED this 9*5^- day of July, 1990. 
J^/PHILIP 
.fth District Judge 
r^ 3 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
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I hereby certify that en this &5^- day of 
.9 19 7^ , a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Terry R. West, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 387 
LaVerkin, UT 84745 
Randy L. Dryer, Esq. 
185 South State Street 
#700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY R. WEST, 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
THOMSON NEWSPAPERS, dba THE 
DAILY SPECTRUM, and DON E. 
HOGUN, BRENT GOODEY and 
RICK OULDAN, 
Defendants. 
) 
MEMORANDUM 
OPINION 
Civil No. 890502682 
This matter came on^  before the Court on October 3, 1990, 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding on the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling en the 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff sought a 
rehearing and reconsideration of the decision which was evidenced 
by the Memorandum Opinion filed by the Court on July 25, 1990. 
Plaintiff was present representing himself and the Defendants were 
represented by Randy L. Dryer. Argument was heard from both sides 
and the matter taken under submission by the Court. Having now 
reviewed the matter in its entirety, including the June 21, 1990, 
U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Michael Milkovich, Sr. 
v. Lorain Journal Co., et al., No. 89-645, (no citation available) 
the Court now renders the following decision. 
The Milkovich case clarifies an area of defamation law 
which has apparently been misunderstood by many Courts across the 
country. In its decision on the Defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment in this matter, this Court relied on apparently good 
authority on both the State and Federal levels in holding that the 
statements of which the Plaintiff complains in the June and July 
articles which had reference to the Plaintiff's alleged change of 
position on the municipal power issue were protected statements of 
opinion under the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
(See the Court's Memorandum Opinion of July 25, 1990, pages 4 
through 11). It is clear that in Milkovich the United States 
Supreme Court has now held that there is no "opinion privilege" 
under the United States Constitution and that Courts so 
interpreting the language in the case of Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 
323, pgs. 339-340, were in error. The Milkovich decision clearly 
holds that under the U. S. Constitution a statement of opinion is 
not actionable if the statement is one relating to matters of 
public concern "which does not contain a provable false factual 
connotation". Statements without such provable factual 
connotation do receive full constitutional protection. ( See 
Milkovich, page 20; Philadelphia Newspapers Inc., v. Hepps, 475 
U.S. 767, page 772). 
^ 
In this case the question is simply whether the 
statements of the Defendants regarding the Plaintiff's position on 
municipal power contain a provable false factual connotation. 
This Court has previously ruled that such statements were in the 
nature of opinions. For the reasons stated in the Court's 
Memorandum Opinion of July 25, 1990, on pages 7 through 11, this 
Court now finds that the statements regarding the Mayor's opinion 
on the position of municipal power do not contain a provable false 
factual connotation and that said statements are entitled to full 
constitutional protection. Specifically, this Court finds that it 
would be impossible for anyone to prove, given the facts before 
the Court in this case, what the precise position before the Mayor 
was on the issue of municipal power prior to the election. The 
only person who would have all of the facts necessary to prove 
that issue would be the Mayor himself. This Court finds that 
under these circumstances public debate on an important issue of 
general concern should not be chilled simply because the figure at 
the center of the debate is the only one who knows his precise 
position. If the law were to hold that anyone voicing an opinion 
does so at the peril of being contradicted by the public figure 
whose opinion is in debate and being subjected to a lawsuit, it is 
clear that no prudent person would voice any opinion in such a 
situation because the person criticized need only deny the 
criticism to set up a winnable lawsuit since his proof would be 
the only proof available. It is the opinion of this Court that 
</>i/ 
the Milkovich decision stands for the proposition that there nust 
be independant objective proof available on the "factual 
connotation" before the matter may be submitted to a trier of 
fact. The subjective attitudes and representations of the person 
criticized are not sufficient proof to meet the criteria of the 
Milkovich case. On the record before this Court there is no 
objective independant proof as to what the attitude of the Mayor 
was prior to the election and therefore the opinions of the 
Newspaper are entitled to full constitutional protection. 
Therefore, the prior decision of the Court on the 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment stands. As requested by 
the Plaintiff and agreed to by the Defendant's counsel all of the 
orders and decisions of this Court previously entered herein, 
including the decision on the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration set forth above are hereby certified as final 
under U. R. C. P. 54(b) for purposes of allowing an interlocutory 
appeal by either side prior to trial. It appears to this Court 
that this case presents important issues of law which should be 
resolved by appellate review before the parties in this matter are 
put to the expense of a trial. 
DATED this October, 1990. 
Court Judge 
yU^ 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
t&tncL I hereby certify that on this _ 
CK^Vt^OA > t 19 30 i a true and correct copy of the 
day of 
above and foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, or 
hand-delivered, to: 
Terry R. West, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 387 
LaVerkin, UT 84745 
Pandy L. Dryer, Esq. 
185 South State Street 
Suite £700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
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RANDY L. DRYER (0924) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Thomson Newspapers, 
Don E. Hogun and Brent Goodey 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
TERRY R. WEST, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
THOMSON NEWSPAPERS, dba, THE 
DAILY SPECTRUM, and DON E. 
HOGUN, BRENT GOODEY and 
RICK GULDAN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
AND CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b) 
Civil No. 89-2683 
Judge J. Phillip Eves 
* * * * * * * * 
Based on the prior motions of defendants for summary 
judgment, the pleadings, depositions, legal memoranda and oral 
argument of counsel at the hearings on said motions for summary 
judgment, and further based on the Court's Memorandum Decisions 
issued July 25, 1990 and October 17, 1990, and upon the Court's 
determination that there is no just reason for delay in entering 
Judgment on the above-referenced motions, and for good and 
sufficient other reasons, the Court hereby enters judgment 
against plaintiff and in favor of defendants as follows: 
1. All claims against defendants Donald Hogun and 
Brent Goodey contained in plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. All claims against defendants Rick Guldan and 
Thomson Newspapers, Inc. in the second and third causes of action 
of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. The claims against defendants Guldan and Thomson 
Newspapers, Inc. in the first cause of action of plaintiff's 
Third Amended Complaint which stem from the publication of an 
article dated July 2, 1988 are dismissed with prejudice. 
4. The claims against defendants Rick Guldan and 
Thomson Newspapers, Inc. in the first cause of action of plain-
tiff's Third Amended Complaint which stem from publication of the 
"municipal power" statements in an article dated June 27, 1988 
are dismissed with prejudice. 
5. This Judgment disposes of all claims against all 
defendants contained in plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, with 
the exception of the claims in plaintiff's first cause of action 
against defendants Thomson Newspapers, Inc. and Rick Guldan which 
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stem from statements in a June 27, 1988 article relating to 
plaintiff's filing of an insurance claim, 
6. Costs are awarded to defendants, but the amount of 
said costs shall not be determined or awarded until the remaining 
claims are disposed of by adjudication, settlement or otherwise, 
at which time defendants and the prevailing party on the 
remaining claims shall comply with the cost provisions of Rule 
54. 
7. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to promptly 
enter this Judgment on the Judgment Docket and the Register of 
Actions and do all other things necessary to render this Judgment 
final, for purposes of appeal, under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. j 
ENTERED this -> day of November, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT JUDGE 
232:102990A 
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TRIAL COURT RULINGS 
WEST V. THOMSON NEWSPAPERS (Nov. 30, 1989, July 25, 1990, Oct,, 17, 1990) 
June Guldan Column July Guldan Column 
(Changed Position on Municipal Power) (Changed Position on Municipal Power) 
November Goodey Column 
(Manipulate the Press) 
Donald Hogun 1. no actual malice 
(Publisher) - did not review 
1. no actual malice 
- did not review 
- advice of counsel 
1. no actual malice 
- did not review 
Brent Goodey 1. no actual malice 1. no actual malice 
(Editor) - no reason to doubt - advice of counsel 
veracity 
- prior history w/Guldan 
1. not defamatory 
- protected opinion 
Rick Guldan 
(Reporter) 
1. protected opinion 1. protected opinion 
- personal observation - advice of counsel 
- city residents 
not applicable 
TabE 
Appendix "E" 
Plaintiff Terry R. West's 
Letter To The Editor 
Mayor speaks 
Editor. Spectrum: 
!t stem* that I spend more timt 
writing articles (letters) for the 
Spectrum than anything else, but 
wnen you are continually being at-
tacked by one of the staff reporters ( 
guess it comes with the job of being 
mayor. 
Aiter being asked to leave a 
meeting at La Verkins town offices 
for irresponsible journalism several 
weeks ago. Rick Gulden apologized 
and said that he would be more ac-
curate in the future. At that time I 
told him that I didn't cart if he didn't 
agree with my statements or actions 
but before he wrote about them, 
please at least understand them He 
promised me that he wouid at least 
do that. Since then ht has always 
touched base with me before quoting 
me or writing about mt as mayor. 
Maybe ht didn't think my personal 
life was included in that promise1 Oh 
well, a promise is only a promise. 
Isn t it funny, when you put a little 
truth to allegations and half truths 
the story or gossip doesn t sound so 
good. In answer to Mr Guldan s arti-
cle of June 27 I respectively submit 
the following truths. 
I I do not own a business in Spr-
mgdale but my wife does and I have 
spent a lot of time putting on in ex-
pansion this spring. She has spent 
most of her life helping me m my 
other businesses I thought it was pay 
back time. But I do have several 
million dollars invested in La Verkm. 
And 1/ La Verkm ever gets its act 
togetMM will invest much more in 
U V ,. 
2. » ave used dealer plates on 
some of my automobiles but I do. 
have others registered in my name 
and my business names. There are 
some fringe benefits to every job. 
I'm still trying to find tht fringe 
benefits that come with being mayor. 
Sometimes the have nots" envy the 
"have s '. I hope this is not the case 
with my favorite reporter 
3 I do not recall ever refusing to 
get a Utah drivers license, but 1 do 
have just as met a home in Wyoming 
as I do in Utah, fully stocked with 
everything, including clothing, so 
that I can jump on a plant and go to 
Wyoming aod stay t months without 
taking anything with mt. Hunting in 
Wyoming; is a fnngt benefit that 
can't be lightly overlooked. Jealous 
Rick? 
4. tt is just not true that I opposed* 
municipal power while I was running 
for mayor last November In fact. I 
stnt a letter to Ls Verkin citizens 
dated October 31, I9f7 encouraging; 
tht citizens to vote for municipal 
power. "Even though thtrt art risks 
ot higher powtr rates in purchasing 
tht powtr svstem. how do you get 
• « I M M ui uus me I I you don't take 
some nska? We do not have a crystal 
bail to forecast tht future and it is on-
ly our opinions as to what wt should 
do." (letter dated Oct 27. 19*7) 
Plaasa get your facta straight before 
you accuse ma of muutading tht 
DtOOit. 
5.1 ntvtr said that tht paopit wart 
not qualified to make a decision on 
municipal powtr. But I have always 
said and I still say that the issues in-
volved were so technical that it was 
impossible to gat an informed vote 
oyerall on tht istut. I have always 
said and still do that it was our first 
mistake to try to get a straw vote on 
such a technical subject Even than 
tht vote was St percent against and 
44 percent for. this vote was doaa 
compared to the vote on the police 
issue which was 77 percent against a 
police contract with Hurricane and 
23 percent for 
The big difference with the police 
vote, was that the issues were very 
simple ones that all have had ex-
perience with. Every household has 
had to balance a budget and most of 
the households in U Verkin had ex-
perience with both the county shen/f 
and with local police. What issues 
could be more simple and qualify for 
a straw vote? I always have said and 
still do that we the elected should 
spend the people's money the way 
the people want us to spend it, but we 
the elected have the responsibility to 
make decisions for the people in 
areas that are technical and an in-
formed straw voce is impossible. 
6 Before you make allegations of 
possible insurance fraud, vou should 
check with your attorney to see what 
your liability for such allegations 
are. But to make the record correct I 
will fill you in on the truth. On Jan 2. 
198S we did have a break-m at our 
business in Spnngdale. and at the 
time all we knew was that a rock had 
been thrown through the door and it 
appeared that no jewelry had been 
taken. You would naturally think 
that when a jewelry store is entered 
that it is jewelry that they are look-
ing for. and it appeared that ail the 
jewelry was accounted for It wasn t 
until the next day that it was found 
that some Navajo rugs valued at 
about 113.000 had been taken. This 
would make our loss about 1/2 the 
retail value. An insurance claim was 
filed for $6,7000. What is so strange 
about these facta, Rick** 
7 It ts not true that at a recent city 
council meeting, I tried for a friend 
to get a conditional use permit for the 
sale of beer pushed through after the 
regular meeting. The truth of the 
matter is that the permit was on the 
agenda and the person was not pre-
sent when it came up Shortly after 
the meeting was adjourned the per-
son came up and asked why his per-
mit had not been considered. We 
opened the meeting up again so that 
his needs could be considered. No 
one had left the room As far as you 
calling him my friend all people are 
my friends but this friend I only met 
that day. 
Terry West 
Editor's not*: You wiii find a 
response to Mayor West's letter in 
Mr Gulden's column today. 
Regarding item six, Mr. Gulden 
was informed by an insurance com* 
pany representative the claim was 
for $13,000 which is, as it turns out, 
the retail value of the missing pro-
perty and Mr. West's claim was filed 
for about naif that amount When 
that was brought to our attention by 
Mr West we printed a clarification 
m Thursdays newspaper. As Mr. 
Gulden points out in his column, he 
never mentioned, nor was there in-
ference intended, of insurance fraud. 
Mr. West introduced the words "in-
surance fraud. 
The Spectrum welcome^ 
tetters from its readers. 
Each letter must include 
the writer's name, address 
and phone number. Letters 
are subject to editing for 
space and clarity. Letters 
may be addressed .to: 
Editor, Daily Spectrum; c/o 
the address listed on page 
4 of each edition. 
